HOW THE SHIP WAS ORGANIZED

 

The following is a short description on how the ship was organized and ran.  Some ships did it differently, but this is how the "W" did it.  We call it the "HOW TO CHAPTER."

 

"C" DIVISION

 

The "C" Division usually had 3 or 4 officers, plus numerous petty officers and non-rated (strikers) men.  It was a varied and diverse group of men.  In the Division, we had Yeomen, Radiomen, Radar men, Sonar men, Signalmen, Quartermasters. 

 

YEOMEN:

 

The ship's office was usually headed by a first class petty officer, sometimes a CPO.  It was mainly the responsibility of the XO, but the "C: Division officer had to handle any personnel  problems, etc..  The organization, work, etc. belonged to the XO. 

 

The ship's office handled all written correspondence to and from the ship.  They kept all correspondence and personnel files and kept them current.  Yeomen had to be expert  typists.  We didn't have any copying machines in those days, so a lot of material had to be mimeographed.  They had to cut a stencil and then put the stencil on the drum of the machine, check the ink supply, and then run off the number of copies required.  It was a rather messy job.

 

We had 2 makes of typewriters, Underwood and Royal (all uprights).  The Underwood machines required much less maintenance and were more reliable.  Since we were out of touch with any repair service for long periods, reliability was important. 

 

While we were the flagship of the Commodore, he had a first class as his personal yeoman, Lawrence Geradi.  He was a big help, as he often pitched in to help with ship's work.

 

At GQ and on regular watches, yeomen were usually talkers on the bridge.  They manned various sound-powered circuits (i.e.  JA Command Circuit).

 

RADIOMEN:    Contributed by CPO George Kolodzey

 

Most radiomen had attended Fleet Radio School.  It was almost impossible for someone to learn how to take code without going to school.  When the ship was commissioned, CPO George Koegler headed up the radio gang.  Later, it was CPO George Kolodzey (GeeKay or Ski-as they called him).  Radiomen had to stand watches (1 in 3) as long as we were underway.  The only time they got a break was when we were alongside a pier and the land facility stood guard for us.  If moored alongside a destroyer tender or in a nest of other tincans, the ships took turns standing radio guard. For long periods of time, we were on our own.

 

We had an Chief Electronic Technician, Jim Putman.  He had the job of trouble-shooting both radio and radar equipment, along with sonar and other electronic equipment.  He had to be good, as we were out of touch with either shore or tender based repair facilities for long stretches.  If equipment failed, we had to fix it or go without.  Going without was not acceptable!  There were no duplicates or back-ups on board.  We did have plenty of spare parts.  Then, the word "transistor" was not heard of.  All equipment used vacuum tubes.

 

In the Atlantic, Radio Washington, NSS, sent out the "Fox Schedules, (Fox Skeds), 24 hours a day, seven days a week-non stop. At the beginning of the War, they sent out International Morse Code, at about 15 words per minute.  But after the War started, radio traffic increased, so NSS increased the rate to 20-25 wpm.  All ships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean copied NSS's transmissions.  At times, atmospheric conditions made reception difficult, especially at long distances.   

 

In the Pacific, Radio Hawaii, sent out the "Fox", also 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no breaks.  At times, when reception was very bad, we had two radiomen copying Fox, one backing up the other.  This made life easier for the decoding officer, to decode messages and clear the "garbles".

 

Radiomen guarded other frequencies, depending on the ship's operation and duties, i.e.. plane guarding, CAP, convoy duty, flagship, etc..  Sometimes, with outside help, we guarded as many as 25 circuits.  Every USN ship, station, base and command had its own call letters.  Most times the call sign was encoded.  The U.S. WILKES' call sign was NIBQ.  The encoded call letters of the ships in our Division, ships we were operating with, the Commodore's, Task Unit, Group, Force, etc. were posted by the radioman copying the Fox Skeds.  The encoded call signs changed  daily. When a message involving one of these units was received, the radioman, on duty, gave it special attention.  He made extra effort to copy it correctly and when completely received, immediately sent it to the Communication Officer, for decoding.  All coded messages were in 5 random letter groups (i.e.. BXRMI  TWQPB --), regardless of the system the message was encoded.  Also the British numbers system -groups of 5 numbers in each group ( i.e.. 59361).  This type of message was very hard for the radioman to copy.   Some dispatches were 100 groups long, some a lot longer, depending on the content. 

 

When the ship was first commissioned, in addition to copying code, etc., the Radiomen maintained all electronic equipment, including radio receivers, transmitters, radar and sonar until the Navy trained Electronic Technicians (ET's) became available to the fleet..  As the War progressed, radio traffic increased and the equipment became more complex, ET's were a necessity.  However many radiomen missed the challenge of working on the equipment.  On our ship, an agreement was worked out, so that the 2 technicians would be responsible for the radar, sonar, and special electronic equipment.  The radiomen would maintain the radio receivers, transmitters, including the outside antennas, insulators, etc..  In that way, our radiomen would keep their skills.  Radiomen would help the technicians when necessary.  More than once, several pieces of equipment needed attention at the same time and both men would work on the equipment.  This arrangement worked very well.

 

Radiomen had a very mentally demanding job.  They had to pay strict attention to the "dit-dot" for at least 4 hours and if at GQ-a lot longer.  After copying code for their full watch, they were mentally and physically exhausted.  After 6 months or so, without any real breaks, they became "dit happy".   In the North Atlantic, the radio shack was nice and cozy but in the tropics, the heat and humidity made it almost unbearable.  The heat given off by the radio equipment was considerable and that added to their discomfort.  Also at GQ, radio personnel were stationed in the emergency radio room, which was a rather tiny compartment aft.   Conditions there were  pretty bad. 

 

In addition to other duties, 2 radiomen, who could take code at a high speed, used their spare time, when not on watch in the evenings, to copy the International Press News.  This service was sent out in plain language (Morse Code), to various press wire services around the world.  They used high speed transmissions, from 45 to 72 wpm (that's fast).  In a few hours our radiomen would copy 8 to 12 pages of news.  When that was done, they made up 10-25 copies of the news and sent it around the ship in the early morning.  The 0400-0800 watch got the news first.

 

 The radiomen used modified typewriters - all the letter keys were CAPS.   Most were Underwood, and a few Royals.  These machines took a terrific beating, as they were in use 24 hours a day.  We had a couple of spares, and we had to do the minor repair jobs ourselves.  When we went into the Yard or alongside a tender, over went our machines to be fixed.  The Underwoods did better than the other typewriters.

 

The cooks, who were up by 0300-0400, making bread and breakfast, always brought the radio gang a fresh loaf around 0500 or so.  Their reward was the first look at the day's news.  The bread was without the weevils, which we often got in the mess hall.  It was called "raisin bread", no extra charge.  This was no one's fault, we were just at the end of the supply line.

 

Radio also published our weekly ship's newspaper, which we called the "Wilkesonian".  It was full of all sorts of stories, gossip, scuttlebutt and the latest "jokes".  It helped us to get our minds off our troubles.

 

On the whole, Communications, Gunners, Torpedomen, Engineers, Deckhands, Officers and Chiefs and everyone else, made up a great fighting ship and a reasonably happy one. 

 

RADARMEN:

 

While radio had been with the Navy for many years, "Radar" was a WWII development.  It means "radio detection and ranging."   All during the war, scientists developed bigger and better radar equipment, with greater and greater capabilities.  Without question, radar shortened the war, saved countless ships and lives.  It enabled us to do things, that would have been impossible, when the WILKES was first commissioned in 1941.         

 

The radarman was a "new" rate and his importance to the ship grew, as the equipment  got better and we got better in using it.  In the beginning, the radar equipment was crowded in the space behind the bridge.  After Sicily, we got a new CIC in a new deck, right under the bridge.  Within 2 years, what was "state of the art", was out of date, when the new Sumner/Gearing class of cans joined the fleet. 

 

With our new CIC (nicknamed "Christ-I'm confused"), the ship was much more effective on any mission.  In CIC, we had an area that was removed from any noise and confusion on the bridge.  It was organized to track and monitor our activities and of all contacts (i.e.. Sub, surface, air).  It was also invaluable in firing shore bombardment, especially at night.  Night firing, without it, would have been almost impossible.

 

In CIC we had 2 pieces of radar receivers- SC (air search) and SG (surface search).  Our SC had an maximum effective range on large targets, mountainous land, of about 125 miles.  The SG had 2 settings - 5 and 15 mile range .  You could switch ranges by just turning a knob.  We had a SG repeater on the starboard side of the pilot house.  It was the favorite spot of the OOD/Conning Officer, while underway.  It was a very valuable/indispensable tool. 

 

Also in CIC, we had a surface plot with a DRT (dead reckoning tracer), with rather thin, tough paper over it.  The paper could be rolled-torn off, etc..  The plotters used marking pens to plot the contacts as well as our own track.  the DRT moved, so a complete plot of every situation was available.  The radar operator would give range and bearing on his sound powered phone, which was connected to the people manning the DRT.  This  information was also received in plot and on the bridge.  Many times, at GQ, the XO was in CIC, along with the CIC officer.  When the XO wasn't there, the CIC officer, Abernathy and later Dave McQuitty handled the work.  On the regular steaming watch, there was a qualified CIC watch officer on duty to assist the OOD, etc.. 

 

Air plot, a plexi-glass vertical board, on which all air contacts, both "bogey" and "friendlies", were plotted.  The plotters used "grease pencils" to post this info and they had to learn how to write backwards-no mean trick. Also all voice calls signs, radio frequencies were posted, for instant use.  Also there were various lighted status boards with up to date ship data, cruising formation, screen formation and positions, etc. Any and all information that might be needed quickly was up on the boards.  They also had a copy of the latest OpOrder and navigational charts. 

 

CIC also had numerous radio speakers for monitoring various voice radio frequencies (i.e.. TBS (UHF), shore fire control circuits, CAP).  We could patch as many circuits to CIC, as we had speakers.  CIC/watch officer had various means for instant communication with other parts of the ship-mainly the bridge, and on occasion, also with the director and plot.  He had head sets for sound powered phones on the major internal circuits (i.e.. JA, JP) and had a switch by which he could switch to any circuit he wanted.  There was a 21MC right over the plotting table and   voice  tube directly to the bridge.  There were several handsets in various places around the room.  Of course we had the regular dial telephone.  So there was never a shortage of ways to communicate.

 

 We also had IFF (Identification friend or foe).  The SC radar operator would send an electronic challenge to a plane contact.  Our and our allies' planes would automatically respond with the proper reply.  The "bogies" couldn't.  Therefore we could sort out the "friendlies" from the "bogies" (enemy).  A modern version is still in use.

 

Since it was lighted (dim) at night, it was invaluable to the OOD, under normal cruising and at GQ to the CO and Commodore.  CIC was a central place from which we could control our ship and in our case, those under the Commodore's command.  CIC was one of the best ideas the Navy had.  The CIC people never let us down. 

 

The radar antennas were mounted on the mast.  The SC (air search) was at the highest point.  This antenna looked like "bed springs".  Later models were more sophisticated looking.  The SG (surface search) was located about 6 feet below the SC.  It was much smaller, solid, 1/2 circle.  Both antenna rotated 360 degrees, continuously 24 hours a day, when underway and many times in port in forward areas. 

 

The radar transmitter and other equipment was in the radar transmitter room, on the deck below CIC.  There was a lot of equipment in a small space. 

 

Our 3 types of radar had different missions, but complimented each other.  SC was long range but not very accurate.  It measured contacts in miles rather than yards.  Its range on land masses was about 125 miles, on large air contacts 75 miles.  SG was much more accurate, both in range and bearing.  It had a short and long scale, with a maximum range  (75,000 yards) of the horizon.  It was used in navigation, piloting, surface search, shore fire control, convoy work, station keeping and in the later stages of the war- to pick up low flying enemy aircraft.  It was our best and most used radar.  FD- fire control- antenna was mounted on top of the fire control director.  Its use and operation was under the control of the gunnery officer.  It had a very narrow beam and very accurate in both range and bearing.  It was used in surface and air action, shore fire missions, etc.  It had a rather short range-15,000 yards.  It was invaluable, when it worked.  Our FC radar was rather unreliable and caused problems at critical times.

 

EXAMPLE: Air contact- SC "Bogey, bearing 350 degrees true, range 15 miles, angels 10 (altitude 10,000 feet)".  From the PIP, the operator could tell it was a single or multiple enemy planes.  This information was immediately relayed to the bridge, director and plot.  The director would train to that bearing and turn on the FC radar (it would be out of our range initially).  CIC would continuously plot the bogey.  When the plane came within our range, the FC radar would pick it up.  When within the range of our 5" guns, it would be taken under fire. 

 

SIGNALMEN:

 

Signalmen have been in our Navy from the very earliest days.  In ancient times, the only method of communication between ships and ships to shore, were signal flags.  Lord Nelson scored many of his greatest victories due to his superior flag communication between his ships.  By WWII, signal flags were still in use, as they are to this day.  However, other means of communication (i.e.. TBS) made visual signals somewhat less important than in years past.   

 

On each watch there were usually 2 signalmen on duty, 1 on each wing of the bridge, always alert for signals from other ships in our formation. The quartermasters assisted as well.

 

FLAG SIGNALS- there were 2 publications for flag signals in use.  The International Signal Book - both flash and flag.  This was rarely used -mainly between USN ships and merchant vessels from neutral nations.  Even during the war, neutral ships were occasionally seen, challenged, passed and sent on its way.  Second: The General Signal Book, which was our "Bible".  It was a  confidential, registered publication - so we had to keep an eye on the copies.  We had a copy of the GSB on the bridge and in CIC. 

 

There were flags for each letter of the alphabet (26); 1 for each number (10); 63 pennants; 3 misc. flags; plus several "tack lines".  We had 2 flag bags- 1 on each side of the bridge-aft, right under the yardarms.  Each bag had all the flags mentioned above.  They were all neatly stowed under the symbol painted on the metal cross pieces of the bags.  In this way, the signalmen/quartermasters would be able to bend on the proper flags, etc. quickly and accurately.  

Each bag had a heavy canvas cover to keep the weather off the flags.  There were 3 flag hoists on each yardarm.  Flags were read from top-down: outboard-inboard.

 

For example:  The Commodore wanted to have the other 3 cans in our Division make a right turn, 90 degrees from our base course.  He'd give the signalman the order "turn right 90 degrees".  The signalman would bend on the proper flags (Turn Pennant and the 9 flag) on the outboard halyard and hoist the signal to the top ( two block).  The other cans, in turn, would hoist the same signal at the "dip" (a few feet below the top).  When the signal was understood by the OOD/CO, and the ship ready to execute the change of course order, the signal would be 2 blocked (hoisted to the top of the halyard).  When all ships had the signal "2 blocked", the Commodore would know that all ships were ready and able to carry out the change of course.  To execute the order, the Commodore would give the order "execute".  Our signalman would rapidly haul the hoist down.  On the Commodore's order, the WILKES' OOD would give the helmsman the order to the new course and the ship would start making a 90 degree turn to the right- using standard rudder.  Then the other 3 cans would turn in our wake (if they were astern of us) and assume a new course 90 degrees to the right of our former course.   All this would be done in much less time than it took to describe it.

 

Using flag hoists to communicate was limited to daylight, good visibility and fairly close proximity. Of course the signalmen, OOD, JOOD, would use telescopes, and binoculars to see the flag hoists.

 

SEMAPHORE:  Semaphore method is also very old.  The flags were about 18 inches square - yellow and red-diagonal color and attached to a short wooden shaft.  It was faster than flashing light.  It could only be used in daylight, in good visibility and at short range.  The sender and receiver must easily see each other.  Signalmen/quartermasters liked to use semaphore to chit-chat between ships.

 

FLASHING LIGHT:  This method was most widely used.  It could be used day or night.  We had 2- 12 inch signal lights, one on each side of the bridge-aft-outboard of the flag bags.  We also had 2 - 24 inch lights.  These weren't used much, except at very long distances or to wake up a sleepy signalman on another ship.  They really blasted.  However they were very handy to have when needed.  We also had a 36" search light on the after deck house.  It was very rarely used and it was tied in the gun director. The 24 and 36 inch lights had carbon filaments and were extra bright.  The 12 inch had high power light bulbs.   To use the 12 inch lights, the signalmen stood on a small stand, so they could see better.  At night they used a blinker tube, as a security measure.  This was a very narrow focused beam of light.  It had to be pointed right at the receiving signalman, or it couldn't be seen.  On the 12 inch light, we had an infra-red adapter that was used at night, again for security reasons.  The usual rate for sending and receiving was 10 wpm, by a good signalman. There were yardarm lights that could be keyed to send Morse code, but they were very rarely used. 

 

Signalmen kept a signal log book, in which they entered all visual messages sent or received.  They wrote out all messages on a standard Navy message form, including the complete text, and the ID of the originator and the addressees.  When received, messages were quickly routed to the CO, Commodore, OOD, XO, Communication Officer, and to any other ship's officer involved.

 

QUARTERMASTERS:

 

We were lucky to have outstanding quartermasters.  The dept. was headed by Chief Quartermaster "Muddy" Waters.  He was also the senior PO for the "C" Division.  He kept everyone on their toes.  Quartermasters had to know all about being a good quartermaster and be a good signalman as well.  He had to be knowledgeable in many other areas as well.

 

Quartermaster is another seafaring skill that dated back many centuries.  Their primary job is the smooth operation of the bridge/navigation, which is the central focus of activity of all ships, while underway.  Their primary job is the ship's navigational charts and equipment.  They had to keep all the charts on boards, up to date and to be sure the proper charts were available and used.   Changes to charts come in Notice to Mariners.  They have to be posted to the proper charts.  Charts were stowed in the chartroom, just aft of the bridge.  They were stored flat in a large steel filing cabinet , along with the Coast Pilot and Sailing Direction publications.

 

They maintained and used the navigational equipment, gyro repeaters, Loran, etc..  They had to know the Rules of the Road and to advise the OOD in such matters.  They had to know the navigational aids, buoys and channel markers when we were in "civilized" waters.  They assisted the XO/Navigator and OOD by taking bearings, while piloting.  They worked closely with the signalmen.  The bridge gang was a TEAM. 

 

They took excellent care of the ship's chronometer, which was most important to the safe navigation of the ship.  We didn't have the advantages of modern electronics and satellites to help plot our positions.  The chronometer had to be wound at 1130 daily-without fail.  They also checked and set, if necessary all ship's clocks.  Accurate clocks were very important in all phases of navigation and safe operation of the ship. 

 

At night, the QM striker with the watch, would wake up the oncoming watch (i.e.. OOD, JOOD, etc.)- not a pleasant task.  No one liked to get up for the mid-watch (0000-0400).

 

One of the most important duties of a QM was the maintenance and writing of the QM Log.  This log was the basis for the writing of the ship's log (each watch) by the OOD.   Accurate, completeness, reliability of his log was a MUST.  It detailed all activity on, by, around the ship, during the watch. 

 

The Navigator assisted by the CQM navigated the ship.  Since many times the Commodore was the senior officer, the burden of safe navigation for many ships depended on us.  Ted Brooks, later Dick Wiess, the XO, and still later Bill Green and Wally Magee were the Navigators.  They took star and sun sights, using sextants, stop watches, assisted by the QM of the watch.  In late 1943, in the Atlantic we got the newly developed LORAN (long range navigation) equipment. It was a big step forward.  It was accurate, easy to use, reliable, and a boon to all Navigators. Much later it was available in the Pacific.  Unfortunately it was not available in the New Guinea area. We sure could have used it.  Even with the advent of Loran, sun and star sights were still done.

 

RECOGNITION SIGNALS

 

The reason for having these signals was to avoid allied ships and planes from attacking 'friendlies".  These were "joint" signals for all allied Navies.  The Communication Officer  had the job of preparing these signals daily.  They were obtained from a classified registered publication, and they changed at 0000 GMT.  There were 2 types of  signals.  First, a light challenge by signal light or blinker tube and then a light reply.  Second- There were 3 sets of 3 lights each, arranged vertically, on both the starboard and port side of the mast.  Each set had 3 lights -red, white, green.  There was a master electric panel on the port side of the pilot house.  The QM would set the correct combination of lights on the panel.  If challenged, all we had to do, was to turn on the master switch.  Then the proper sequence of lights would be displayed.  The QM would test these lights daily, during daylight hours.  The proper signals were posted at the signalman's deck and written in chalk on the splinter shield on the bridge.  In this way, the correct signals were available to the SM, QM, and OOD.  Fortunately we were not challenged very many times.  There were a few incidents when we were challenged and didn't give the "proper" reply.  It turned out that the challenger gave the incorrect signal.  But it made for a few heart stopping minutes until we opened up the safe and double checked. 

LOOKOUTS

 

This was another part of seafaring that dated to the dawn of ships.  Basically we had 2 lookouts-one on each side of the wings of the bridge-as far forward as possible.  In rare instances, we had a lookout in the bow-in cases of low visibility or in shoal waters.  At GQ and when air attacks were possible, we put 2 lookouts on the flying bridge and sometimes on top of  the aft deck house. Those not on the bridge were on the JL sound powered phone circuit.

 

It was a low-tech job, but an important one.  Most were right out of Boot Camp and still learning.  They used binoculars to scan the sea and sky.  They switched every hour, so they were always fresh and alert.  Most were also watch standers in the upper handling room.  In the North Atlantic, they could get warm after an hour on lookout.  They were an invaluable part of the bridge team and the ship couldn't operate without them. 

 

SONARMEN

 

They used the sonar anti-submarine detection equipment.  They operated the sound stack, which rotated the sound dome, under the keel of the ship, about under the bridge.  The dome could be retracted into the ship when not in use.  The sound dome sent out a sound wave, that if it hit an object, would bounce back (echo) a sound signal. In water, sound waves move about 4800 feet per second.  The very sensitive receiver would pick up the return echo and give the operator the range and bearing of the object.  The range was determined by the time it took  the sound wave to return to the ship, after hitting the object. 

 

Originally the sound stack receivers were located just aft of the bridge.  When we got our new CIC, the sonar equipment was moved there.  The sound stack had a small wheel, which the operator moved 5 degrees each time- 90 degrees on each beam, continuously going back and forth.  The effective range of our equipment was about 8000 yards.  It was the best means of detecting and tracking a submerged enemy sub.  Later we got equipment that could locate subs by changes in the magnetic field. To be effective we had to be very close or over the sub.

 

In connection with sonar work, we had a Bathothermograph, which was used to determine the water temperature at various depths.  It was a small boom, with thin wire cable attached to a glass cylinder with material that showed the temperature and depth.  We got  this equipment  in late May 1943 and it was installed port side aft.  ComDesLant loaned us an officer and 2 enlisted men on TAD to operate the new equipment, as it was still experiential.  The officer was Lt. Bill Kleinfelter, a very fine fellow.  After they left, our sonarmen operated it.  They took readings 2-3 times a day and the results were posted by the sonar stacks.  The theory behind this equipment-Sound waves had difficulty in penetrating cold layers of water and German subs would take advantage of these layers and hide there. 

 

 Many of the operators were musicians in civilian life.  The subtle difference in the return sound beam was most important in telling whether or not we had a sub contact or a whale.  We recall one "good" contact.  We and another can made repeated depth charge attacks, but didn't get any results. 

 

All the sonarmen, along with several of our officers, had gone through the Fleet Sonar School.  Our XO, Dick Weiss, was XO on the NOA, one of the school ships at Key West.   He was very knowledgeable in sonar work.  The WILKES practiced with new Fleet subs in New London and Casco Bay.  Both the subs and we got good practice.  They usually won.

 

With our new CIC, we had a greatly enhanced capability in anti-sub warfare.  Our CIC watch was always practicing and training.  A portion of each watch was devoted to such work.  Also in each major US port, the navy had sonar simulators for refresher training.  Both Brooklyn Shipyard and NOB, Norfolk had such training facilities.  We always tried to send our sonar operators and several officers for training.  The simulators were very good and the training was worthwhile.  We had 2 sonarmen on each watch.  The off duty man was the helmsman on the bridge.  They switched each hour, to keep them fresh.  

 

HELMSMAN

 

Many men had multiple jobs and responsibilities.  Everyone had to work together and be responsible for their important job.  No job was unimportant!!!

 

The helmsman was a key man on the bridge team.  Today, ships have auto-pilots and the helmsman job is rather routine (a stand by job)  But in our time, he steered the ship where the officer with the "CONN" directed.  He had to do it right and right now!  His job was especially important went the ship was maneuvering in tight places (i.e.-refueling at sea, coming alongside a dock).  A missed command could/did have unfortunate results (an accident).  Even in rather routine situations, such as station keeping in ASW, or AA screen, required a high degree of skill.  A good qualified helmsman could make the OOD job a lot easier and a poor one, made it a lot harder. He was also responsible for the engine room telegraph and the shaft turn indicator.

 

TALKERS

 

Every station on the ship had talkers trained to use the sound powered phones.  The system was quite simple.  They had a head-set, with ear phones and a mouth piece secured with a strap abound the neck, plus a long wire lead to a plug in the nearby bulkhead.  They were just what the name implied-the sound of the voice powered the signal.  No electrical power was needed-just an unbroken wire.  It was  very reliable and could and did operate if the ship lost electrical power or was badly damaged.

 

On the bridge we had the JA (command circuit), 1JS -connected to CIC, among others.  The talkers were usually yeoman with lots of experience.  They had to relay messages and information accurately and quickly.  They also had to have a cool head, when things got hectic.

 

 

 

 

OTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

 

Voice tubes-probably dates over 150 years.  The main use was between the OOD and the CO, in his sea cabin at night.  Since the OOD couldn't leave the bridge and the CO had to have his info immediately, the voice tube was a good solution.  At night the CO had to know of any unusual or important event or to be informed per the instructions in the CO's night order book.  There was a tube going into CIC-right over the plotting table.   There was another one to the flying bridge, where the torpedo director and air look outs were stationed.  No need for electronics here.

 

1MC- This was a loud speaker system to all parts of the ship.  Every compartment had a speaker.  It was used to call the crew to GQ along with the ringing of the bell.  If the CO had something to talk to the crew about, he used the IMC.  If the OOD wanted someone to lay up to the quarter deck, the word would go on the 1MC.  It was a one way system, no talk back.  Only the CO, XO, OOD, JOOD could OK, its use.

 

21MC  This was  similar to the 1MC, only it had switches to direct the information to the desired places.  It was a "talk back" system.  It was mainly used between the bridge and CIC.

 

HANDSETS  This was also a sound powered system.  The set was similar to a regular phone.  It had a push call button.  You pushed the button and it buzzed on the other end and you gave whomever answered, the message.

 

SHIP'S TELEPHONE SYSTEM  This was just like a shore based dial phone system.  There were many extensions throughout the ship.  You just dialed the number you wanted. It was mostly used to call the radio shack, wardroom, bridge, quarter-deck.

 

PASSIVE SYSTEMS  These were several types.  The engine order telegraph was used to give the engine room, speed orders from the bridge.  It had a circular dial on a pedestal, with the engine revolution telegraph mounted near it.  The engine order telegraph had 2 brass handles-one on each side.  The right handle for the right (starboard) screw and the left one for the left (port) screw.  Stop was straight up.  Forward (ahead) speeds were:  1/3, 2/3, Standard, Full, Flank.  It was possible to have the starboard screw 2/3 ahead and the port 1/3 back, or any combination you needed.  Backing speeds were: 1/3, 2/3, Full.  The engine room would comply immediately with all orders.  There was a bronze pointer that they used to match up with the bridge's orders, to show they were complying. Only the CO, XO, OOD, or the officer with the "Conn" could give such instructions. 

 

The engine revolution indicator had 3 windows, with numbers 0-9, in each and a knob which was turned until the desired number showed in the window.  Normally it was set at 139 revolutions, which was our standard speed.  All other speeds were based that number of RPM.  In station keeping the OOD might add or subtract a few turns to keep on station..  Full speed was 20 kts, Flank-25 kts.  If any higher speed was the CO or OOD would call the engine room and tell them what speed was needed. (i.e.-going to pick up a downed pilot).  In an emergency, if more speed was needed immediately, the handles were pushed down twice, followed by a call to the engine room. On the bridge there were 2 engine revolution indicators, which showed the actual Rpm's of the shafts.  This indicator was most important when the CO was going alongside a tanker, or carrier for fuel, etc. He had to know our exact speed and how much to adjust it.

 

TBS (talk between ships).  This was new and very valuable means of communication between ships in the formation or nearby.  It was an ultra-high frequency voice radio transmitter/receiver.  It was absolutely indispensable in handling convoy operations, working with carriers, etc.  for giving orders, instructions, etc.

 

On the bridge, we had 2 handsets: 1 for the Commodore and one for the ship. There was also a handset in CIC.  There were speakers in both the bridge and CIC. Even though plain language was used, it was quite secure, as its range was normally only the line of sight.  However, under certain atmospheric conditions, its transmissions could travel several hundred miles.  Each ship and command had its own call (i.e.-ALPACA BADGER).  These were listed in a registered publication.  However, for specific operations, special code names were assigned by the command that issued the OpOrders.

--------------------------------

CHARTS

 

One of the most important jobs of the QM/Navigator was getting, upkeep, and updating of our navigational charts.  Without proper charts, the ship would not go very far, without running into trouble. All USN charts are issued by the US Hydrographic Office.  Basically there were several types of charts: 1. Pilot Charts-small scale of  large areas; 2. Navigational-general sailing charts (small scale),which show approaches to large area of the coast.  3. Coast Charts.  4. Harbor Charts-large scale showing harbors and their approaches in great detail. All charts had numbers, so they were easily identified and filed.

 

Whenever we were in a US port, we picked up the latest Notice to Mariners, which came out monthly.  Important changes were published ASAP, sometimes by dispatch, if urgent.  In forward areas, charts were much less exact, than in older, populated areas (i.e.- Continental US, Europe).  In the New Guinea area, our charts were primarily based on hydrographic work done many years ago (mainly 19th and early 20th century).  In other areas in the far Pacific, the charts were based on work done by our namesake in the 1830's. 

 

The Navigator was the key man, in keeping the ship and all hands safe.  A good one was absolutely necessary..  We were blessed with good ones.  Our grounding in Newfoundland was due more to factors beyond the control of our navigator, than fault on his part. They were:  very bad weather, which precluded proper star sights, poor routing by the C&R officer, who should have scheduled our landfall during daylight hours; no operational RDF stations nearby.  The SG radar hadn't been developed yet and the SC radar was very rudimentary and was never designed for navigation. 

 

 

 

 

TACTICAL DATA:

 

When each Navy ship was commissioned, they went through a "shakedown" period.  When the WILKES was first commissioned, it was pretty much left to its own methods to learn about the ship and train the crew.  However by mid 1944, the Navy realized that some standard shakedown/underway training was necessary.  Specialized units were set up on both coasts and Pearl to give this training. 

 

One of the first things done, when a ship got underway for the first time, was to determine its tactical data.  While ships of the same class, look the same on the outside, each one had its own unique characteristics.  They all handle differently and the ship's officers must be familiar with its characteristics.   These were:  the time and distance it takes to go at various speed ahead to stop and then astern. (i.e.. full ahead -20kts to full astern).  The measured mile, which determines the RPM for1/3,2/3, standard, full and flank speed.  Turning circle-the distance and time required to make a 360 degree circle at various speeds and rudder angle (advance and transfer).

 

DEGAUSSING:

 

One of the unique characteristics of each ship, is its magnetic field.  It is important in 2 ways: It affects the magnetic compass readings and 2nd: During the early years of WW2, the Axis developed a very effective magnetic mine and later a magnetic torpedo.  The Allies developed an effective countermeasure-degaussing equipment.  This system decreased the ship's magnetic signature.  Electric coils were installed around the ship's hull, near the waterline.  They were kept activated while the ship was underway.

 

Each major US port had a degaussing station and every ship had to "run" the degaussing range, which was a series of coils on the sea bottom.  After the runs were completed, the station furnished the ship with a folder, which gave the ship, the proper settings for various ship headings and longitude and latitude.  After each visit to a repair yard and if any substantial repair work was done, new settings were required.  The QM were responsible for the setting the proper degaussing settings and they were checked on each watch.  The gauges were in the chart house. 

 

MISC: 

 

We had an anemometer, which was mounted on the mast, just under the SC radar antenna-facing forward..  There was a syncho repeater mounted in the chart house.  This showed the apparent wind velocity and direction.  During the hurricane in the North Atlantic in Dec 1943, the anemometer blew away at 100+ kts. 

 

Of course we had a barometer and thermometer (wet and dry bulb).  The QM took hourly readings, which were posted in the QM log book.  In periods of  bad weather, the Commodore, CO, XO, OOD would need more frequent readings.  In forward areas , we did not have any outside help in weather forecasting.  We were on our own.

 

OFFICER OF THE DECK: (OOD).--IN PORT

 

There have been hundreds of books and articles written on this subject.  The following is only a bare outline of  his job.

 

The OOD was the person responsible for the safety and operation of the ship.  Of course the CO and XO were primarily responsible but the OOD was the officer on the "spot".  First we'll cover the job, while the ship is in port.  At that time, the ship may be moored at a pier/dock, anchored,

moored in a nest of ships (usually with other cans) or alongside a tender.  His station was on the quarter-deck, which was usually on the main deck, at head of the sea ladder or gangway.

 

He had several men to help him. First-the JOOD, who was usually a junior officer and in training.  The JOOD assisted the OOD, but the OOD had the final say. 

 

The boatswain mate of the watch was the real doer.  He was the top enlisted man on duty and he was the key to a smooth running watch.  He checked the men's Liberty cards-going and coming.  He passed the "word" on the 1MC.  He carried out the instructions of the OOD and JOOD.  He checked on the ship's boat and its personnel.  He checked on the ship's mooring lines and if at anchor, the anchor and chain.  He also kept an eye on the sentries on the forecastle and fantail, so see if they were alert.

 

The messengers-there were usually 2 men-usually S1/c, S 2/c.  They handled the lines of boats coming alongside, taking visitors to see the Commodore, CO, etc.

 

The OOD and JOOD carried sidearms (45's) and wore OOD, JOOD armbands on their left arms.  If a senior officer (flag) was in a nearby ship, they wore dress blue uniforms, gray gloves, and carried at "long glass".  Fortunately we didn't run into many flag officers.  Otherwise they wore the working uniform.

 

If the ship was anchored/moored alone, the signal bridge was always manned by a signalman/ QM.  Of course the radio gang operated as usual.  When we were at a pier, the land based facilities usually stood radio and visual guard for us.  If in a nest of cans, the "guard" rotated among the ships.  Being the "flag" we usually set up the schedule.  If moored alongside a tender,  etc., they usually took the "guard" for us and for all ships alongside. Of course, during daylight hours, the signal bridge was always manned.  The OOD had to keep an eye on this situation.

 

SHIP'S BOAT:

 

We had 1 motor whale boat.  If not at a pier, it was our one and only way to get ashore and back to the ship, or from ship to ship. The Commodore had first call on the use of the boat.  He was always very considerate and there was never a problem.  The OOD was responsible for the ship's boat, its schedule, and safety.  This was one of his primary jobs.  He had to know where it was and when it was getting back to the ship.  He gave the coxswain (the petty officer in charge of the boat) his orders and instructions.  The coxswain had to be a man of excellent judgment and common sense, along with a strong sense of responsibility.  We can recall 2 excellent ones- Fullerton and Paul Craig.  It took a lot of skill and practice to bring a boat loaded with shipmates alongside the ship, in bad weather, and in the dark.  In those days, the OOD had no way of contacting the boat, once it got out of shouting range. Now, the boats are all equipped  with 2 way radios and the ship and coxswain can communicate. That makes for a much easier and safer operation.

 

Boat engineer-  He was another key man.  While the coxswain was in charge, nothing went unless the motor worked reliably.  2 excellent engineers come to mind: John Mercer and Louis Schwartz.  They could be depended upon. 

 

Bow-hook was usually a S 1/c or S 2/c.  He had to be agile and able to get the bowline to the ship or pier, quickly. He also usually handled the stern line, as well.    

 

In port the boat was usually in use almost all day and into the night  A regular boat schedule was posted so the crew on liberty could get the boat back to the ship.  The OOD had to see that the schedule was kept.  When not in use and no trip expected soon, the boat was tied up to the fantail.  The boat crew had to scramble up and down from the stern.  They had to be sure-footed. The boat had a capacity of 35 men and had a small canvas canopy  in front to help protect the men from the weather and spray.  Officers, CPO's and senior PO sat under the canvas (RHIP)(rank has its privilege).

 

If the ship was taking on stores, ammo, fuel, etc., the OOD had to see that all safety precautions were followed and the work done safely and quickly, as possible.  He was assisted by the JOOD and the Division Officers of the division doing the work.  Ammo, stores were an all hands job. 

 

The OOD greeted all visitors and saw that they were escorted to the proper party, wardroom, etc.  Sometimes high ranking officers came to visit the Commodore and they were accorded special treatment.  Vendors, etc. were kept at the quarter-deck and the person wanted was paged on the 1MC. 

 

In the shipyards, civilian employees working on the ship were screened by ID badges.  The OOD was responsible for seeing that the shipyard regulations were followed (i.e. fire watches).  He also made sure the workers were working.  A very few didn't take their jobs seriously.  Since we always had a strict deadline to meet, our job was to get the work done ASAP.     

 

In different places, the OOD had different concerns.  In USA ports, he was mostly concerned with the liberty parties-getting off and back to the ship on time and in proper uniform.   Also with visitors, getting stores and having the yard work done.  In forward areas, while uniforms were more informal, he had to be concerned with possible air attacks.  In "Gib"-attacks from frogmen.  

 

In CONUS, liberty was usually up at 0800, unless we were scheduled to get underway earlier.  In forward areas, liberty was either non-existent or greatly limited, and the maximum on liberty 1/3 of the crew.  When back from liberty, they turned  in their liberty cards at the quarter deck.  Then the cards were taken to the ship's office, where they were kept under lock and key.

 

If a crew member was tardy returning to the ship, the man was "put on report" either by the OOD or his Division Officer.  The CO would have "Captain's Mast" to determine what punishment, if any, to be given.

 

OOD/JOOD UNDERWAY

 

When the WILKES was first commissioned almost all the officers were Regular Navy and graduates of the Naval Academy.  As the war progressed, more and more were Reserve Officers.  By 1943-44, the majority were reserves, with a couple of "mustangs".  Except for the engineering dept., most of the reserve officers were graduates of either the Midshipman School at Columbia U (Prairie State) of Northwestern University in Chicago (Abbott Hall).  In later stages of the war, a few came from the V-12 program. 

 

A few months prior to coming to the WILKES, they had been in civilian life.  Some were recent college graduates, some practiced law, others working in private industry or for the government.

 

After Midshipman School, most had gone to one of more Navy schools (i.e.. radar, sonar, gunnery, communications, etc.).  However for reserve officers, very little of his training was related to his primary duty, at least on a destroyer, how to stand watches while underway.

 

First, the newly arrived officer was assigned to JOOD duties, both in port and underway.  In port, duties were quickly mastered and within a month or two, he was standing OOD watches.

 

However, learning to be a qualified OOD-underway, was a hundred times more demanding. Watch Officers stood underway watches, one in three.  That is: two - four hour watches each day.  Sometimes, in forward areas and in threatening conditions, we stood watch and watch.  That is four hours on duty, four hours off.  This was in addition to  their other duties, such as department head, etc.

 

General Quarters:  Usually the OOD on watch when GQ was called, had duties elsewhere, so it was imperative that he be relieved very quickly.  Most of the time the Communications Officer was the OOD during GQ.  In our ship, we were at GQ a lot.  While underway, we went to GQ, 1/2 hour prior dawn to 1/2 hour after sunrise.  In the evening 1/2 prior sunset, to 1/2 hour after dark. We had to do a lot of training, so we went to GQ to train the gun crews, CIC, damage control parties, etc.  Of course, we went to GQ in combat situations.  When GQ was over, the regular watch took over again. 

 

REGULAR UNDERWAY:

 

It is almost impossible to cover all aspects in detail, but will try to hit the most important parts. 

 

The WILKES was the flagship of Destroyer Division 26, later, in the Pacific- for a short time #2, and then, for the rest of the war #24 and #14.  Many times the Commodore was the senior officer and he had large responsibilities.  He would decide what, when and how.   For most of the war, he didn't have a staff, except for 3 enlisted men: yeoman,  steward and signalman. The ship's Communication Officer, doubled as his staff. 

 

In a convoy, in almost all cases, the Commodore was in charge.  We were out in front.  We wrote up the orders.  In both the Atlantic and Pacific, all convoys  zigzagged, in accordance with standard zigzag plans, as a defense against enemy subs.  The senior officer (his staff) chose the plan to be used.  Each escort had a designated station in the screen around the ships being convoyed.  The OOD had to patrol in his designated station-keeping the prescribed distance from the "guide ship", and within the proper bearings.  Usually most escorts were  in the front and on the flanks, with 1 or 2 in the rear, to keep the German subs from attacking from the rear and to watch for stragglers.  In  patrolling our station, the OOD had to continuously change course to maintain proper distance and bearings from the guide.  It was a real chore. In daylight we could take range and bearing visually from the bridge.  We had a small portable visual range finder that was attached to the pelorus.  We used it for a quick distance reading.  If necessary we could get an accurate reading from the SG radar.  We got bearings from the pelorus.  At night, it was a lot more difficult. Before we got the SG radar, it was just guess-work and hope.  Once we got the SG, we depended on it,100%.  We had a SG repeater on the starboard side of the pilot house, and the OOD could see all the ships within its range   It was a most popular spot. 

 

The zigzag plans required the entire formation to change course, usually every 5 minutes or so.  The time varied, as did the amount of course changes, to throw off any lurking subs.  These changes in course, were from the base course, which would get us to our destination.  The plan was repeated every hour-on the hour. We had a small  box, lighted by a small red bulb, on the bulkhead, just inside the starboard side of the pilot house.  The plan was posted inside and the OOD would look at it every time a course change was due.  We used a stop watch to time the course changes.  Time was very important.  Miss a course change and you risk a collision, or at best, be way out of position.  Station keeping and coordination between escorts was very important.  We had to be sure our sonar beams overlapped.

 

With carrier ops, sometimes we were just one of the escorts.  Other times, the Commodore was the Screen Commander, which entailed the responsibilty for all the escorts in the screen.

 

At night there were absolutely no lights on the bridge, or anywhere topside.  All ships were completely dark at sunset-with NO exceptions!!  Everyone on the bridge had to know where every button, phone, speaker, switch, etc. was, in the dark.  Good night vision was a must.

 

The OOD was the man in charge.  The "buck"" stopped with him.  Until the CO, XO relieved him, he was responsible!!.  Many times the OOD delegated the "conn" to the JOOD, so he could get hands on experience in ship handling.  But the OOD kept a close eye on what was going on.  There wasn't much that could be learned from a book.  Hands on experience was absolutely necessary.  You had to ''do it'' to learn it!!

 

There was something awe inspiring about the mid-watch, to look out and see 15 other escorts, plus 90+ merchants ships, spread out across the horizon, in the moon light. All plodding along, towards the Med (Europe) at 9 kts., the safety and well being of all in your hands.  Not many 22 year olds get such a chance. 

 

The OOD handled all the ship's routine during his watch.  For example:  the fireroom wanted to blow tubes (always done at night).  The OOD would have to check the wind direction, etc.  He didn't want the soot landing on the decks.  That would make a big mess for the deck division to clean up the next morning.  Also he'd "hear" it from the 1st Lt.  Many times the OOD would say: "wait, until we change course".  When the wind was favorable, he gave the OK.  The same routine with dumping trash and garbage.  You didn't dump it near land.  Small details are important.  If the fireroom made smoke, especially during daylight, the OOD would inform them they were making smoke. They would then make the necessary adjustments to stop.  Enemy subs and planes could see smoke for many miles.  They could see the smoke before they could see the ships.  It didn't pay to advertise our presence.

 

The OOD had to make sure the lookouts were alert and told of anything special they should be looking for.  Most OOD's always spent sometime talking to the lookouts, to train them.   Also the watch had to be properly dressed.  In the North Atlantic, lots of warm, dry clothes, heavy gloves, etc. were a necessity.  In the tropics, rain gear was a must for all topside men.  We could look at the SG radar screen and spot rain squalls ahead and be prepared.

 

Before he retired for the night, in his sea cabin, the CO wrote any special instructions for the OOD, in his "Night Order Book".   The on-coming OOD would read and initial these instructions and carry them out to the letter.  Some of these instructions were standard and long standing, other pertained to that  night. 

 

Before relieving the watch, the incoming OOD would get a complete briefing by the OOD going off watch.  Some things were always covered:  any special instructions from the CO, Commodore, etc.; base course and speed; any changes in them coming up, when and what; what fireroom/engine rooms on line (i.e. 1 & 3); zigzag plan; any equipment failures-status; any contacts or anything special seen or done on the outgoing watch; anything else of importance; any special weather info (i.e. a rapidly falling barometer);  any change in our screen position.  The briefing usually took about 10 minutes.  That's why the incoming OOD got to the bridge 15 minutes prior to taking over the watch and also to get his eyes used to the dark. 

 

The incoming OOD would say " I relieve you, Sir", and salute.  He would then have the watch. The outgoing OOD would then give his binoculars to his relief and go into the chart  room to write his entries into the Ship's Log.  It was very important to do this before leaving the bridge. He would consult the quartermaster's log, to prepare his entries.  After he was finished, he would sign and date it.  This was then the official log.  Later the ship's yeoman, would type up the entries, into a smooth log.  Each OOD would then sign his entries in this log.  

 

If  anything unusual occurred, the OOD had to inform the CO.  During the day, the CO was either in his cabin, doing paper work, or in the wardroom.  At night, he slept in his sea cabin, which was located on the starboard side, just aft of the pilot house.  There was a voice tube from the pilot house into the sea cabin.  If the CO thought it was necessary, he'd come to the bridge and take a look.  If any thing really important, the Commodore was called on the phone.

 

On his watch, the OOD was in constant contact with our CIC, especially at night and in bad visibility. CIC monitored the ships, etc. around us.  If there were any changes, the OOD was told.  In the daylight, under normal conditions, the OOD didn't bother CIC.  The bridge talkers   were in contact with the director, plot, engine/fireroom.           

 

When necessary, the OOD could talk to other Navy ships in our group, using the TBS (talk between ships).  This was invaluable.  Only the Commodore, CO, XO, OOD, JOOD could use it.  Every ship had a call name (i.e. CHARLIE NOBLE) and strict Navy voice procedure was used.  No chatter was allowed, but many violated this important rule and it became cluttered on occasion

 

Most times, the Communication Officer was the OOD at GQ, special sea detail, refueling, hi-lining, etc.  The CO always had the Conn, except at GQ, if nothing important was going on. When we did shore bombardment, the Communication Officer was the SFCO (shore fire control officer).  He controlled and directed our fire on shore targets.  He was in voice radio contact with the control people on the beach.

 

The OOD was responsible for the signalmen and quartermasters on the watch.  They were well trained and did a fine job.  Any visual messages sent or received, were always routed to him. 

 

When maneuvering with other ships, the OOD was responsible for carrying out the orders of the OTC.  Most times we were senior, but sometimes we operated with much senior officers.  Proper, prompt carrying out these orders were a must.  Movements, especially, at night, and in close formation and at high speed, made for dangerous situations.  Part of being a good OOD was avoiding such hazards.  The CO's command rested with the OOD. If  he fouled up, the CO was responsible.  Hazardous situations could develop very quickly, so immediate and correct decisions, were imperative.

 

While convoying in the North Atlantic, if the Commodore was task force commander, he would order us to make a sweep 20 miles ahead of the convoy, at dusk GQ.  This was done as we approached dangerous sub waters and was done to drive down any lurking subs.  If any subs were reported ahead of us, he would also order a course change by the whole convoy.  In our scouting, we'd go at 20 kts.  If the weather was bad and the seas high, it was a thrill.  The OOD had to figure our course out and back to our spot in the screen.  He used the maneuvering board to figure out the solution.  He had to be proficient in it's use.  Our CIC watch officer always ran the same problem as a back-up-good practice.

 

If in a combat area, the OOD would sound GQ, if we had an unidentified or enemy contact-either visual or on the radar.  He didn't have to consult anyone.  Sound GQ to be on the safe side.  The Communication Officer would relieve the OOD and he went to his own GQ station. 

 

Under normal conditions, the OOD would stand 8 hours of regular watches, 2 hours of dawn and dusk alert (1 hour each).  If he stood the 1200-1600 watch, he relieved the 1600-2000 for dinner.  Sometimes we didn't "dog the watches".  So in addition to his regular jobs, the OOD could stand 11 hours of watches a day, in addition to that-any GQ for training or combat.

 

The best watches were the 0400-0800; 0800-1200; 1600-2000; 2000-2400.  The more senior officers got these watches.  The junior got the mid-watches. 

 

At night the QM striker on duty would wake the oncoming OOD and JOOD.  That was a thankless job.  Since good night vision was necessary, the ship's interior lights were kept as low as possible.  As soon as the OOD and JOOD woke up, they put on night vision goggles.  Then they dressed, put on their life jackets.  If in cold weather, several layers of warm clothes were worn, plus foul weather gear, and boots.  At night the cold and wet was a big problem.  The OOD had to stand outside in the freezing wind and cold, for 4 hours.

 

In the tropics, the day watches were the problem.  The watch had to put up with the awful heat, humidity plus the boiling sun.  For months we operated within 4 degrees of the equator (South/North).  The watch had to wear long pants, long sleeved shirts (not rolled up), but buttoned at the cuff, the helmet liner, plus a life jacket.  It was most uncomfortable-to say the least.  If at GQ, then add the steel helmet and the .45.  The only "break" we got-no tie.    

 

One of the more hair raising duties of the OOD, while underway, was the maneuvering involved in operations with the Fast Carrier Task Force.  The ordinary ship disposition involved a circular screen of 10-12 cans, with the carriers, cruisers, and battleships (if any) in the center of the formation.  One of the ships, usually a carrier with the senior officer present (OTC), was designated as the guide.  The cans would be in designated stations, such as: station #1  bearing 030, 3000 yards, station #2, 060, 3000 yards, etc.  This worked out fine when all the ships were in position.  This formation was established upon leaving the anchorage and proceeding on an operation.  The assignments, etc. were usually in the OpOrder. 

 

Whenever flight operations were pending, either launching or recovering, the FOX signal flag would go to the yardarm of the guide.  The course and speed flags would then be hoisted and upon execution, all ships would turn into the wind, on the new course.  All ships would increase speed, sometimes to 32 kts, and flight operations would start.  A can would be designated for plane guard duty and would be stationed about 2000 yards ahead of the formation. Another can would take up station astern of the formation.  Their jobs were to pick up any pilots, who might go into the water on takeoffs or landings (the plane guards). 

 

But, when one or two of the stations in the screen were vacant, due to plane guard assignment, or not enough cans were available to fill the circular screen (this was an AA screen formation), the screen had to be re-oriented with the vacant stations at the back of the formation.  This could happen either in flight operations or in the normal course of events.  It was a scramble to adjust the stations.

 

That is when the OOD  earned his keep!  As soon as he knew what the new course would be, he had to plot, on the maneuvering board, the new station and the new course and speed needed to get to that new station.  When the signal was executed, he would have to come to the new course and either add speed or reduce it, depending upon where it was determined the new station to be.  Many times there was some confusion, as one or 2 ships, "didn't get the word", or made an error in finding its new course.  So the OOD had to be very alert, not to hit another maneuvering ship. 

 

After a nominal length of time, the screen commander would determine which ship or ships were not in the proper position.  He might embarrass them by giving them a "Posit" either by flaghoist or by TBS radio.  No OOD wanted to get one of those! 

 

This maneuver doesn't sound like much now but, when you think back 50 years and consider the fact the OOD might be a 20 year old fresh from the plains of Oklahoma, it gets scary.  Unusual things can happen on this type of maneuver, such as turning the wrong way to your new position, and find yourself several thousand yards away from your proper station.  Going 32 kts, it only takes a few minutes to get way out of position but a long time to get back to the right place.  This would not only incur the wrath of the screen commander, but the displeasure of your CO.  In addition, you would get plenty of dirty looks from the engineering gang, when you must suddenly ask for more power than they are able to give.

 

We didn't have night carrier operations very often, but went we did, the we had the same problems, only it was much harder at night.  The CIC was a big help.  But the OOD still had to make the hard decisions.  Re-orientation of the screen was sure a tough chore.     

 

 

 

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT - "S" DIVISION

 

The Supply Dept., the "S" Div, was a little known but vital part of our ship. Without it, the ship and crew would not have gotten very far (distance) or stayed at sea very long.  Practically everything that came on board, was ordered, processed, accounted for and stowed by the supply people.  They were the supply clerks, the cooks and bakers, and officers' steward mates. There were also mess cooks, who were S 2/c, F 2/c and were loaned to the "S" Division on a temporary basis.  They did the hard work of helping to prepare the meal-peeled the "spuds", helped to serve, cleaned up the mess deck, etc.  

 

The Navy had 3 classes of property:  Title A- the hull and anything permanently attached to it (i.e.. guns, torpedo tubes); Title B- Loose equipment, such as side arms, binoculars; Title C- perishables - like food, ammo, fuel.  Every piece of equipment (Title B) had a number and each department head was responsible for everything assigned to his dept..  Periodically an inventory was made of all such equipment and a report given to the CO, who forwarded it to a higher command (ashore)     

 

The store keepers requisitioned all the ship's supplies, food (everything except ammo and fuel).  It was a big job, as we could only take on supplies when in a major port/base, with a Navy Supply Depot, or from a supply ship in the forward areas.  Sometimes, more often than not, it was a long time between re-supply.  We could carry food for about 3 weeks.  After that, we'd start to run out of all types of food.  First we'd run out of fresh milk, then in about 10 days fresh fruit/vegetables.  We had a "spud locker" on the main deck about mid-ships-port side.  Potatoes would last about 10-14 days, then powdered spuds.  After no more fresh milk, we'd get powdered milk, which was pretty awful.  It was all that was available, so it had to do.  We used canned milk in the coffee-another awful substitute. On many occasions, we ran short of food, and everyone (officers and crew alike) went on short rations.

 

We had freezers for frozen meat, but they also had a capacity for about 3 weeks.  Then Spam, etc. was the daily fare.  In the New Guinea area, we could only get "lamb".  It was pretty rank and stringy, and very unappetizing.  It made Spam taste pretty good, by comparison.  Actually Spam wasn't all that bad.  When the ship got supplies, the crew would "divert"  a few cases of Spam for night sandwiches.  It was also superior to the crew's Sunday night entries, which were cold cuts and cheese.  This menu wasn't popular nor tasty.

 

Until Jan 1944, a few days before we left the Brooklyn Navy Yard, for New Guinea, the Supply Dept. and the "S" Division was the responsibility of one of the assistant communication officers.  Since he was a line officer and had no prior training or experience in supply matters, it was "on the job training".   Fortunately we had several top notch store keepers and a fine staff of cooks and bakers.  They knew their business and did an outstanding job, under adverse conditions.  One of the store keepers was Dave Conway.  He was a SK 2/c and at GQ, a 20MM gunner. Just as we got ready to go the SW Pac, we got a supply officer-Ted Simmons.  He was a fine and much needed addition. 

 

The other important job of the store keepers was paying the crew.  They made up the pay list for both officers and enlisted.  When we didn't have a supply officer, the very first thing, the SK did, when we came into port, was to get a Navy paymaster and get him on board.  In a US port there wasn't any problem, as every NOB or Station had paymasters.  In foreign ports-forward areas, the flagship or tender were always willing to pay us.

 

Many, probably most, crew members let their pay "ride" on the books, when we were not in the US.  Some had obligations back home and bought money orders from the tender/flagship.  Some needed money to buy items from the ships store.  Officers usually drew some money, as they had to pay their mess bill of $30, per month.  They also had to buy things at the ships store too.  With the very abrasive covering on the all the decks, shoes wore out very quickly and had to be replaced.  No shoemakers on cans.  The SK kept the pay records and the paymaster would accept them and pay the crew.  The "S" Division officer and a SK would help him.  He would count out the money, our officer would re-count the money to double check it.  The crew member would sign the pay list and get his money.  The CO got paid first, then the XO.  Pay day was a big event.

 

SHIP'S STORE

 

We had a small ship's store that sold a small variety of essentials.  Most of the crew smoked cigarettes, so they were a best seller.  It also sold candy, gum, dungaree pants and shirts, uniform shoes, socks, shaving gear, etc. - no luxuries.  An SK was in charge and it was only open a couple of hours a day.

 

COOKS AND BAKERS

 

These men had to get up very early (0400) in the morning-7 days a week-no breaks.  They had to get the bread baked, and breakfast ready.  In the CONLUS, we ate very well, but as the time away from the States increased, the quality decreased.  In the New Guinea area, we were at the far end of the supply line.  We got, what others closer didn't want-or so it seemed. Our supplies were precarious.  What we did get, certainly wasn't gourmet, to put it mildly.  The bakers made our own bread.  No store bought for us.  We had ample oven capacity to keep us well supplied.  Since baking was done in the early AM, the watch standers always tried to get a loaf of bread to go with their coffee, "to see if the bread met with their approval".   Our biggest problem was getting the flour and other ingredients in the forward areas.  Sometimes, we got a "little extra ingredients" in the flour.

 

A lot of coffee was drunk, especially by those on watch-to keep alert.  Every compartment had its own "joe pot".  Navy coffee was so strong, that most of the crew used canned milk to make it potable.  We once ran short of condensed milk and the shipboard priorities were as follows: first the crews mess ran out, then the officers wardroom ran out.  But somehow the Chiefs never did run out - wonder why? 

 

Our ship wasn't designed for as many crew members as we had to have for wartime operations.  Our storage capacity was based on the number of the peace time crew.

 

Before we left NY for New Guinea, the officers decided to buy an ice cream machine.  Imagine looking for an ice cream machine in mid winter and in the middle of a war.  Fortunately in NYC, you can find anything, anytime.  No one can recall, who had that brilliant idea, but the whole crew benefited.  We didn't have much time, but we bought one.  All the officers contributed towards its purchase.  We were a bit short of money to buy it, so Rusty Miller kicked in the balance, as memory serves about $200- a big sum at that time. We got shares in the machine, that were later paid back, by charging the enlisted, CPO, and officers messes for the ice cream.  Prior to that, the only times we got ice cream, when we were in a US port, or we bummed it from tankers, cruisers, carriers, etc., when we re-fueled or re-supplied.  We were no longer second class citizens.

 

STEWARD MATES:

 

There were 6-7 stewards mates/cooks for the officers mess.  Their regular job was to cook, serve meals, keep the wardroom, officers' rooms clean and bunks made up.  At GQ they manned the 20MM guns, worked in the ammo magazines and handling rooms, all very important jobs.  

 

SHIP'S LAUNDRY:

 

One of the many jobs of the "S" Division officer was the running of the ship's laundry.  It was located on the port side of the main deck, just aft of the break in the deck.  We had 2 firemen assigned to this work.  They charged a fix rate to wash and press pants, shirts, underwear, socks, etc.  They also did the wardroom's linens, as well as the CPO's.  Most enlisted men washed their own clothes-in a bucket.  Officers and chiefs had their clothes washed in the laundry.  All hands had their clothes stenciled with their names.  All dirty clothes were put in marked bags and stacked until washed and pressed.   

 

We had 2 large commercial washers and steam heated dryers.  There were also 2 presses, so that shirts, pants, and dress blues could be pressed.  We didn't have any dry cleaning equipment

 

Most of the time, there was a mountain of unwashed clothing.  The machines were unreliable and the laundry men disliked the job, as it was in addition to their regular watches.  They got extra money for working in the laundry.  We took them off regular watches and eventually the unwashed clothing was down to a manageable amount.  

 

WARDROOM-OFFICERS' QUARTERS:

 

The Commodore, CO, XO had cabins, with facilities, on the same deck as the radio shack and code room - the deck above the main deck.  The Wardroom and other officers' rooms were on the main deck.  The officers' rooms were just forward of the wardroom-2 to a room- 1 bunk up, 1 bunk down.  Each bunk had a railing so the occupant didn't get thrown out on the deck in bad weather.  The rooms were very spartan-at one time they had a metal door, but to save weight, they were removed and replaced by a flimsy curtain.  So any noise in the passage way made it hard to sleep.  They had a small metal desk, with 2 small drawers, 2 small combination safes and 2 small metal cabinets above the desk.  Opposite the desk, there where 2 metal wardrobes to hang coats, uniforms, etc..  There were 10 cabins-5 on each side of the passageway.  Everything was compact!  

 

The officer's "head" was forward of the #1 upper handling room, on the port side.  There was a water tight door, with a high coaming, between the cabins and the handling room, so making the trip was a bit hazardous.

 

The CO was the President of the Officer's Mess.  At all meals, he sat at the head of the table. The Commodore sat to his right, the XO to his left.  If we had any visiting  Admiral/ General, he sat on the CO's right and the Commodore moved over to the left.  The Mess Treasurer sat at the opposite end of the table from the CO.  For a long time he was John Bayus, the Chief Engineer.  He had to listen to the CO's complaints about the food and service.  The other officers sat by rank, from the head to the foot.  There was not enough room for all officers to sit at the same time, so 2 settings were necessary.

 

Breakfast was served from 0630 -0815, with no specific sitting.  You came, when you could..  Since watches changed and quarters (if in port) were at 0800, the watch standers had to eat, as early as possible.  There wasn't much choice for breakfast-usually powdered eggs, scrambled, dry cereal, oatmeal, toast, coffee, tea, powdered milk.  Fresh fruit, milk, etc. were rare, except in the CONLUS.

 

Lunch:  2 sittings-starting at 1130-1230.  Those with the watch  got priority.  Nothing fancy.

 

Dinner:  1700-1800.  The CO usually presided at the first sitting and the Commodore usually ate then as well.  No one sat down at the table until the CO was seated.  The officers with the watch got priority.  Sometimes we didn't "dog" the watch, so the man with the 1200, relieved for dinner.  We had soup, when available, main course-usually meat.  In the New Guinea area, we ate a lot of "lamb", which was mostly Aussie mutton.  It had a rank taste and  no one ever got used to it.  We got a dessert-pastry, ice cream, after we got our own machine.  Soft drinks were usually not available, due to a lack of storage space.  We did manage to get some COLA syrup and used CO2 cartridges designed for the belt life preservers, to give it the fuzz.  Both the cartridges and syrup soon ran out. 

 

At dinner, everyone tried to put on clean uniforms, get shaved and showered.  We tried to be "civilized" in an uncivilized environment.  Sometimes, it was not possible to clean up prior to dinner, due to GQ, watches, pressing work.  All hands had strict fresh water hours - usually 1/2 hour after each watch.  If you missed the hours, you missed shaving and showering - no exceptions!  Fresh water was a very scarce item.  Everyone conserved it.  The boilers got first call on the best fresh water, everything and everyone else, was secondary.  Our evaporators had a tough time working in the tropics, due to the high temperature of the sea water.

 

In the wardroom, there were 2 rather long leather built- in couches, along the outboard bulkhead.   They made a pleasant place to sit.  In a pinch, they were made into extra bunks.

 

The registered publication safe was on the starboard side of the forward bulkhead, near the passageway to the officer's rooms. 

 

The wardroom table served as a working space.  The communication officers used it extensively, when they were working with the registered pubs.  It also served as the operating table for the ship's doctor.  In the forward area, operating room lights were positioned over the table, ready to be used, on short notice.  The CO, XO and sometimes the Commodore used it for meetings with the officers.  For summary courts-martial, they put a green cloth over the table.  The ship's Recognition Officer-Buck O'Berry used it to give us instruction on ship and aircraft ID.   

 

When we were in NY, Norfolk, etc., officers, especially those with the duty, would invite their wives and friends on board for dinner.  Of course they would have to inform the head steward of any guests.  We would wear our best uniforms, "dress blue Baker".  We'd have the better  china, silverware and good table linen.  It would make for a pleasant evening and it was nice to meet the wives and friends of  fellow officers.

 

We had a "fiddle board" that fitted over the table, with holes to hold the plates, dishes, cups, and silverware.  This was used in rough weather to keep everything from flying off the table.  There were pad-eyes in the deck and poles to lash the chairs to, so you didn't tip over.  In the North Atlantic, these things got a lot of use. 

 

The officers' pantry was on the starboard side, just aft of the wardroom.  There was a pass through into the wardroom.  There was also a good sized kitchen.  This was the province of the cooks and stewards and if you knew what was good for you, you stayed out of that area.

 

CHIEF PETTY OFFICER'S QUARTERS/MESS

 

The CPO's lived and ate in a rather small, cramped area, forward of the #1 upper handling room, forward of the wardroom area.  They had their own mess/food/ bunks/"head", with mess cooks to cook and serve the meals.  While it was better than the crews berthing area, it was spartan, to say the least. 

 

CREW'S BERTHING/MESSING

 

When we were commissioned we had 175 enlisted men.  So our space for the enlisted men, was 175.  Our war time complement was around 235-240 men. So we had an extra 60 men to find space for them to bunk and eat. Each Division was responsible for their compartments.  The Division Officer, the leading PO and Master-at-arms inspected their compartment each day.  It was necessary to keep the living and messing areas neat and clean.  No loose gear was permitted.  The men bunked in very narrow bunks, held by chains from the overhead.  They had mattresses but these were rather thin and narrow, and covered by green fire resistant material.  The bunks were in 3/4 deep in tiers.  Each compartment had forced air ventilation via ducts that ran across the overhead.  As the ship aged, these ducts became more and more clogged, so that eventually not much fresh air got below. With the tropical heat, it made living/sleeping rather difficult.  Each crew man had a small metal locker for him to stow his gear (clothes, shaving equipment, personal items).  The locker could be locked.

 

Baths/toilets--Communal.  There was no privacy there. All the fixtures were made of stainless steel, for easy maintenance and cleaning.  All areas were cleaned daily and kept clean at all times. There was a crew man assigned to keep it clean-"his cleaning station."  

 

Messing--Cafeteria style. We had cooks and bakers, who were the "pro's"  They were assisted by mess cooks, which  each Division had to furnish.  Considering the lack of food, while operating the very forward areas, long periods of GQ, etc., the Commanding Officers insisted the crew got the best of what was available.  Sometimes it was pretty meager, but that couldn't be helped.   

 

 

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

 

We had a steam turbo reduction gear main propulsion plant, with two engines of 25,000 High Pressure (HP) each, a 50,000 HP plant, powering 2 screws, with a top speed of 39.4 knots.  Two engine  rooms, one engine each and two fire rooms with two boilers in each.  Each boiler delivered 600 pounds of steam at 800 degrees F, to the engine rooms.  

 

The Department consisted of the main propulsion, which drove the ship through the water and the auxiliary machinery, which supported the main propulsion machinery and the life of the ship itself.  The main plant consisted of two main engines, each having a cruising engine, which allowed the ship to go up to 25 knots and a High Pressure (HP) engine to drive the ship to flank speeds (up to its maximum).  They also had a reverse turbine to stop or back the ship.  There was a reduction gear to reduce the high RPM of the turbines to power the screws.  Each engine had its own supporting machinery, a main condenser, to turn the used steam back into condensate (water) to be re-used.  Two air ejectors, one in service and one on stand-by, to pull a 30 inch vacuum on the main condenser, receiving the used steam from the engines.  A main circulating water pumps  for cooling the main condenser at speeds under 5 knots.  Above 5 knots, forward, the scoop injection on each main condenser took care of the condenser cooling water.  Each engine room had two condensate booster pumps,  one a cruising driven by an electric motor and a main, driven by a steam turbine.  The condensate pumps took suction on the main condenser  and discharged into the de-aerating tank, where the feed water was heated for the boilers and the air removed.  The booster pumps took a suction form the de-aerating tanks and discharge boiler feed water at 80 pounds to the main feed pumps, that supplied the boiler with feed water at 750 pounds of pressure.  This was 150 pounds above the boiler steam pressure.  Each engine room had two feed water pumps. We'd use one or two pumps, depending on the need for feed water.

 

Each engine room had a main electrical generator. It's turbine also discharged into the main condenser, when the main plant was operating, and into an auxiliary condenser when the main plant was secured (in port).   Each electrical generator had its own electrical board, that governed and controlled the generator and the electrical needs throughout the ship.  Each engine room had an oil renovator, or oil purifier, to keep the main engine lube oil clean.  This renovator was on line at least 8 hours a day.  By keeping the lube oil clean and free of water, the oil never wore out.  The forward engine room had the starboard engine, which drove the starboard screw and was the controlling engine room.  The after engine room had the port engine and drove the port screw. 

 

The Department had 4 Divisions: A Div (Aux), B Div (Fire rooms and Boilers), E Div (Electrical), and M Div (Engine rooms).  It was headed by the Chief Engineer and 2 junior officers, as assistants.  We usually had 5 CPO's: 3 Chief  Machinist mates(CMM), one in charge of each engine room and one  in the A Div.  We also had a Chief Watertender (CWT) in charge of both fire rooms.  The Chief Electrician Mate (CEM) was in charge of all electrical equipment on the ship. 

 

The Aux. Div was responsible for all machinery , except for the main propulsion machinery.  This included the machine shop, all refrigeration, evaporators (fresh water for the boilers and crew), steam heat, the 150 pound line, which supplied steam for the whistle and siren, heat for the living quarters, galley and laundry.  Also included was the steering engines (both regular and back up), compressed air throughout the ship, for both engineering and gunnery departments.

 

The M Div was responsible for both engine rooms, including all machinery in the engine rooms, except the evaporators in the forward engine room and the 100 pound air compressor in the after engine room, which was in the A Div. 

 

The B Div had the responsibility for both fire rooms and their 4 boilers and all pumps, and blowers, except for the main air compressor in the after fire room, which was in the A Div. 

 

E Div was responsible for all electric equipment-from the main generator and electrical board in the engine rooms to the light bulbs.  Everything electrical was in the E Div.  If it ran by electricity, the E Div was responsible for the juice to make it run and the equipment to get it there.

 

Engineering Standard Anchor Watch

 

The Chief  Engineer, after receiving orders from the Captain that the ship would anchor and could secure the main plant, gave his orders to the chief of the watch in the controlling engine room, after the ship was anchored.  "Secure the main plant, the after engine room and number 3 boiler will have the aux. watch."  The chief in the controlling engine room (forward engine room)  would call both fire rooms and the after engine room and relay the orders.  The fire rooms would secure all boilers on line except for number 3 boiler, which would maintain steam for the Aux watch in the after engine room.  The people in the engine rooms would secure all steam to the main engines and shift the electrical load to the after generator and electrical board.  The forward engine room would then secure all machinery in their engine room, except for the evaporators. 

 

The after engine room would start their aux condenser, shifting the main generator exhaust to the aux condenser and secure all machinery not needed to maintain feed water for number three boiler.  When this was done, the aux watch was set, one MM 1/c or MM 2/c was in charge of the watch and one fireman in the after engine room and one fireman on the evaporators in the forward engine room.  One WT 1/c or 2/c and 2 firemen on watch in the after fire room on number 3 boiler.

 

For example, if we were getting underway  at 0600.  The Chief Engineer would give the following orders:  "Light off the plant at 0400, all 4 boilers, be prepared for flank speed."  At 0400, the fire rooms would light off the other 3 boilers and both engine rooms would start their jacking gear, turning over the main engines as steam is emitted to them for warming up.  You couldn't start the ship, like a car.  To avoid problems, the engines and turbines needed about 2 hours to properly warm up.  Both  engine rooms would start a set of air ejectors, leaving one on standby, on the main condenser and start the main condenser circulating pump to the main condenser.  Engine room #1 would then shift the main generator exhaust to the main condenser and warmed up the standby main feed pump. At the same time, #2 engine room was following the same procedure, starting their main condenser, air ejectors, circulating pump and main generator.  #1 engine room , which has been carrying the aux load while in port, secure the aux, now that the generator is exhausting to the main condenser. 

 

When the after engine room had their generator warmed up and up to speed, the electrician on the electrical board in the forward engine room, would drop a  little of the electrical load to the electrical board in the after engine room, where the electrician on duty would pick it up.  This would go on, until the electrical load was split equally between the 2 generators.  All the while, by using the jacking gears, the main engines would be turning over very slowly, with a little live steam running through them, to warm up the turbines.  This also would take about 2 hours.

 

As we got closer to 0600, the CO would tell the Chief  Engineer: "We will get underway in 5 minutes."  The Chief would order the securing of the jacking gears and isolate the plant.  We  started the plant in the cross connected condition. Now we would close all connecting lines between the #1 and #2 engine rooms.  The forward fire room would supply steam to the forward engine(starboard) and get its feed water from the forward engine room.  The same would apply to the after fire and engine rooms.  Each were isolated from the other and operated as a separate unit. 

 

The bridge would ring up 139 turns as standard speed and then rings up 1/3 speed ahead.  Each throttle man (both starboard and port engines) would open the cruising throttle to 150 pounds.  This should bring the screws up to 45 RPM and the throttlemen would adjust their throttles to get 45 RPM (fine tune).

 

For example:  GQ was sounded and the men dropped down the hatches into the fire and engine rooms.  The steaming watch was relieved by the GQ crew.  In the engine rooms the chief of the watch was now in charge, with  the MM 2/c on the throttles, 2 MM 1/c on the upper level, 2 MM 2/c on the lower level.  One EM 1/c on the electrical board, 1 fireman on the evaporators and a fireman with sound powered head phones at the throttle board to write down bell changes (changes in speed) and relay messages to and from the bridge.

 

The enunciator rang up standard speed, 15 knots, 139 RPM.  the messenger wrote it down as the throttle man opened up the cruising engine throttle to about 250 pounds pressure and adjusted to 139 RPM.  Then the main circulating pumps for the main condenser were secured, left on stand-by, for any speed forward, less than 5 knots.  The main condenser sea scoop will supply the condenser with cooling water. 

 

The messenger called out "Bridge says change over the high pressure engines (HP engines)."  Flank speed was expected. The upper level man opened the steam valve to the HP engines and closed the steam valve to the cruising engines.  The throttle man was watching this and opened his HP throttle, while closing the cruising throttle.    The chief  told the after engine room to do the same and when they have it done, they tell the chief.  He, in turn, told the bridge, "We were now on HP engines."

 

The fire rooms had their own enunciators and were informed what the engine rooms were doing, enabling them to cut in or out burners, to maintain 600 pounds of steam pressure and 800 degrees  temperature.  If the ship had to make drastic speed changes, a good throttle man  would watch his steam gauge and not open or close his throttles faster than the fire rooms could make their steam adjustments. 

 

Some of the repair items from our overhaul in Seattle, have been located.  Just to give the reader, some small idea, of the work involved in getting ready for the "yard" and for the yard to do the job and the follow up needed.  " Job #84 (priority #84).  VALVES-AFTER FIREROOM--Remove, overhaul and/or repair, test and reinstall the following fireroom valves.  Replace where needed. 1. Bottom blow valves on #3 and #4 boilers. 2.Surface blow valves on #3, and #4 boilers.  3. Guarding and overboard discharge valves for #3, & #4 boilers.  4.  Main steam cross-over. 5.  Overhaul throttle valve to #2 fire and bilge pump."   The list of work goes on and on  page after page.  Then it lists the people responsible:  Eng.Officers, WHITAKER, CWT, SPANGLER, WT 1/c, SPROUL, WT 1/C, KING, WT 2/C.  Whitaker, Spangler, Sproul, and King were the men really responsible. 

 

Engineering Dept--By John Mercer

 

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

 

There were basically 4 types of GUNS under the jurisdiction of the Gunnery Department.  First: Small Arms--as noted in other parts of the book, we had a very active Boarding Party.  We practiced a lot but never had to put our training into practice (combat). There was a Gunner's mate in charge of all small arms, which when not in use, were under lock and key, in the small arms locker.  We had several types: M-1 carbine-just like the Army used, BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), Thompson sub-machine guns and Colt .45 cal pistols.  All officers, except the Medical Officer, were issued a pistol and 2 clips of ammo.  All officers and the Boarding Party were proficient in the use of these weapons.  Whenever the spirit moved the CO, we got to practice firing from the fantail. 

 

 

20MM

 

When the ship was first commissioned, AA defense wasn't the primary duty of a can. We originally had Browning 50 Cal machine guns as our primary close in AA weapon.  It was almost identical to the Army's gun, just a different mounting.  In the early days of the War, it was replaced by the 20MM gun, which had been designed by a Swiss company (Oerlikon). We had 4 of these guns-2 right under the bridge and just aft of the #2- 5" gun.  The other 2 were just aft of #2 stack.  Each gun had a 5 man crew: gunner, trunnion operator, 2 loaders and a talker.    The gunner was the man, who fired the gun.  He had a safety which had to be released before the gun could fire.  He had to be strapped to the gun, (for safety reasons and to give him a stable base) and his shoulders fitted into curved shoulder rests.  The gun had to be cocked with a cocking lanyard, that was part of the gunner's job.  The gun would fire continuously, as long as the trigger was depressed and the magazine had shells. The projectile had tracer material in the base.  The gunner could follow its flight and adjust his aim accordingly. The trunnion operator  raised and lowered the pedestal to accommodate the gunner-raised it when the gunner was firing at a high target and lowered it, when he was firing at a low level one.  The loaders got the magazines from the ready lockers, put  60 pounds tension on the magazine springs and then  put them on the gun.  When all the shells were fired, it only took a few seconds, the cycle was repeated.  After firing was over, all members helped pick up the empty brass, that might have spilled out of the cartridge bag, to be re-cycled. 

 

 The gun was air cooled, so after firing 8-9 magazines, the barrel had to be changed.  Spare barrels were kept at the guns and a tube filled with water was available to put in any barrel that was over heated or had an unexploded round stuck in it (a common problem).  We had special tools and asbestos gloves to work on the hot guns.

 

They had an effective range of about 1000 yards, maximum range of about 4,000 yards, and were mostly used for close in AA defense, firing at floating mines and very close in shore fire.  The gun could be fired at any rate the gunner chose.  It took about 3 seconds to fire the entire magazine, if he kept the trigger depressed.  The rate of fire was about 450 rounds per minute, if the gun was fired continuously.  They were stored in the 20MM storage magazine below decks and in the ready boxes behind each gun, with no tension on the springs. The loaders had to put maximum tension on the magazine springs, as they had a tendency to lose their tensile strength and could cause a "hang fire" in the gun.  All hands were well trained in handling of any mal-function, as any round in the gun or barrel had a tendency to "cook off" rather quickly. There was charged salt water hose by the gun to cool it off, as necessary.   

 

The original 20mm guns had a gun sight with 6-8 concentric rings.  The code word for all gunners-"Lead the Target"-like in bird hunting.  By mid-war, a new sight based on the gyro was installed.  This new sight improved the accuracy and the gunner just had to keep the "X" hairs on the target and the sight put in the "lead" automatically, and compensated for the pitch, roll, yaw and ship's speed.  Also later in the War, a new and improved version of the gun came to the fleet, which over came some of the problems with our earlier model.

 

20MM shells came on board in large metal containers and the gunner mates had to put them into the magazines, which was a very tedious job. To protect them from the elements, when not in use, the guns were covered by large canvas covers, which had to be removed to fire the guns. 

 

In condition 3 , our normal wartime cruising condition, 2 guns were manned (usually the forward ones).

 

40MM

 

This gun was a very fine piece of equipment.  It  was very reliable and accurate.  It was used for intermediate AA defense (range about 2500 yards), shore fire ( a very effective close in weapon), and to sink floating mines.  It could be used against small vessels, like barges, but we never had the opportunity.

 

We had 2 twin mounts, about 2/3 the way aft, where the original #3-5" gun was located.  When the ship was commissioned, we had 5 -5" guns.  A short time later, it was removed and the 40MM mounts installed.  The gun was originally designed by a Swedish arms firm-Bofors.  It was the replacement for the 1.l inch AA gun (the Chicago Piano), which was quite unsatisfactory.  Some ships of our class still had the 1.1 guns, up through the Italian campaign.  We were lucky to have the 40MM.  It came in 3 versions-single mounts for small ships, twins for cans and DE and quads for BB, CV, CA, CL and newer DD's.  . 

 

The gun mounts had hydraulic drives, which made it easy to point and train the guns.  There were electric motors for each function along with a lot of hydraulic lines.  It was a fairly complex weapon.  They could be moved manually, which we practiced daily.  They could be tied in with the main battery director or could be controlled by its own director (MK 51) (which was available about mid-war).  Each pointer/trainer (pointer on the left, trainer on the right) had concentric ring sights (Lead the Target), which could be used if the directors were not operating.  The guns could be fired either by the director operator or by the trainer, using his foot treadle or the firing motor.  The trainer moved the gun laterally and the pointer in elevation (up-down).  The guns were water cooled and we never had any problems with over heating. 

 

The crew consisted of: gun captain, pointer, trainer, talker, at least 4 loaders per mount, director operator.  The director operator, who also wore head phones, stood on a raised platform just behind the mount.  His director was fairly simple, quite similar to the gyro sight on the 20MM guns.  The director also had a back-up concentric ring sight.  Later in the War, this director could also control guns 1 and 2 for AA defense, at the option of the CO, Gunnery Officer.  The operator had to know his aircraft ID--friend/foe.

 

These guns were very reliable and the only problem-the loader had to put the clip of shells into the gun exactly right.  If they were slightly canted, the gun would jam, but  it was easily fixed.  They had a high rate of fire.  The shells had a tracer in the base and the director operator could follow its flight and adjust his aim accordingly.  The ammo were fed into the gun with 4 shells to a clip.  The shells came on the ship, all ready in the clips, in large metal cans, which took 2 men to carry.  They were stored in the 40MM magazine and in ready boxes near the guns.

 

FIVE INCH--38-MAIN BATTERY

 

This gun was  dual purpose, used against both surface and aircraft targets. The inside diameter of the barrel was 5 inches and  was 190 inches long (38X5)-thus the name 5"38.  When the ship was commissioned we had 5-5" guns.  In a few months the Navy removed gun #3, and replaced it with 2 twin 40mm mounts.  We never renumbered guns #4 and #5.  The guns were mounted in enclosed gun mounts (blast shields) to protect the guns and crews from the weather and possible enemy fire.  It allowed the gun crews to work in the dark-they had very dim lighting inside. On some of the older cans, the guns were not enclosed. 

 

Each gun mount had a crew consisting of a gun captain, pointer, trainer, loaders for both shell and powder, rammer man, hot case man.  The gun captain was the gunners mate in charge of the mount.  He wore the head set and was in contact with the director and plot.  The pointer (on the left side of the gun) moved the gun manually in elevation and the trainer (on the right side) moved it laterally.  Normally the mounts were in "automatic", that is connected to the director and followed the director's movements automatically.  Semi-automatic-the pointer and trainer followed the director by matching pointers.  Manual-the pointer and trainer used their own optical range finders in the mounts and used manual controls for the gun, in case the director was knocked out of action.  Fortunately we never had to do this in real-life, but every day trained doing it. When the loaders put the shell and powder cases on  the tray, the projectile man, hit a switch and the rammer at the rear of the gun-sprang forward, and rammed the shell and powder into the gun, the breech closed and the gun fired.  Out came the hot powder case and it was caught by the hot case man.  He threw it out of the mount, through an opening in the rear.  The hot powder case came out very fast and  was "red" hot.  The man wore asbestos gloves, but often got injured by the flying case.  After firing, all hands had to pick up the empty powder cases so they could be returned and re-used.  There were also a fuse setter, who manually set the fuse, if necessary and a spade man

 

In our opinion it was a terrific gun, along with all the gear that went with it.  It was very reliable, easy to use, good range and fine rate of fire (depending on the training of the gun crews), good hitting power.  It was used against all type of targets, except floating mines.  Our specialties-against enemy ships, like we encountered in North Africa.  Enemy troops and guns, pill boxes, etc. in shore fire, in all our theaters of operations.  AA (anti-aircraft), with an effective range of about 12,000 yards (6 miles).

 

We had several different types of shells for use against various targets.  AA Common-the most used type.  It had fuse in the nose cone, which was set to explode at the timed flight to the target.  This was set automatically at the gun, by "plot", as the shell came out of the shell hoist.  It could be set manually (but rarely done-too slow).  This was used against planes and for shore fire.  It could be set to explode above the ground (tree bursts) or explode on impact.  White Phosphorus--This was used against enemy troops and pill boxes (dugouts), and was very effective.  Smoke--to help us and the shore spotters locate our bursts Vs enemy troops and other targets. Usually fired singly or 1 of 4 guns.  Star Shells-These were used extensively at night in support of our ground troops (especially in the Admiralties).  However in our experience only about 1 in 4 star shells worked, the rest were duds.  Proximity Fuse--were used exclusively against aircraft.  We were one of the first ships to get them (May 1943).  We used them to good effect in North Africa and Sicily, as well in the Pacific.  We nick named them "super dupers."

 

All shells had rotating bands, made of soft copper, at the base of the shell.  When the gun was fired, the lands/grooves in the rifling in the gun barrel cut into the rotating bands.  This made the shell turn (rotate) in the gun and also prevented the powder gases from escaping pass the shell.  The shell needed all the "push" it could get.  The small end of the shell was the nose and the large (back) end was the base.  The middle (machined) part was the bourrelet.  Each 5" shell weighed about 52 pounds and the powder case about the same. 

 

All ammo except a few rounds in each mount (for emergency use) were kept below decks either in the upper, lower handling rooms or in the magazine (most keep there).  Each upper handling room had rows of 5" shell in brackets all long the bulkheads.  There were hydraulic lifts between the guns, handling rooms, and magazines.  They had protection devices to prevent any fire or flash-back from getting beyond the immediate area.  This was a fine protection against a fatal explosion. 

 

Control of the guns rested with the Gunnery Officer (Gun Boss), and of course the CO, who had the FINAL WORD.  At GQ the gun boss was in the director and ran the show from there.  When we were underway, condition 3 set-at least 1- 5" gun and its upper handling room were manned, along with the director and plot.  The director (Mark 32) which was mounted on a pedestal above the flying bridge.  It was the highest manned position on the ship.    On top of the director, the FD radar antenna was mounted.  There was also a large optical range finder, as a back-up system.  It was the heart of our gunnery system.  It was moved/powered by an electrical-hydraulic system.  It had a range finder operator, radar operator, pointer-trainer, gun boss and several others, all in a very confined space, full of electronic equipment, gauges and dials.   It controlled all the 5" guns and the 40MM could controlled by it as well.  Our FD radar was fine when it worked.  We could get ranges 25 (+-) yards.  However it was unreliable at critical times.  On one occasion, we couldn't fix it and had to get a civilian technician from the tender, to come with us, into combat.  One evening, the radar caught fire.  Fortunately the defective parts burned and the technician and our people were able to repair it.  It worked fine for awhile.  One problem, it was sensitive to heavy firing.  Keeping in mind there were many vacuum tubes in each piece of equipment-no transistors then.  The director was tied into the master gyro compass, so that the director had a stable platform, and it was not affected by the rolling and pitching of the ship.  This was a key element is our fine fire control system.

 

Plot---This was the "brains"  of the system.  It had a rudimentary mechanical computer.  It was connected with the gun mount and director.  It got information from CIC and the director and solved the firing problems.  It took such information as: our course, speed; the course,  speed, distance of the target; location of target-if shore based;-course, speed and distance of the enemy plane, etc.  It would come up with the firing solution, which would go back to the director and to the guns. While it was rather primitive by today's standards, it was state of the art during WW11.

 

Handling Rooms--Each gun had an upper and lower handling room.  In the center of each upper handling room was the base of the gun on the deck above.  There were also hoists for shell and powder cans (l each). They could be reversed, so the unused shell and powder cans could be returned to the handling rooms/ magazines.  There were the usual "miles" of hydraulic and electrical cables in each area. 

 

Magazines-- These were  very secure spaces in the interior of the ship.  They (the 5") were inspected by the duty gunners mate every hour, the temperature taken and recorded.  It was most important to keep them dry, cool and stable.  Samples of the powder were taken and tested periodically.  They were always locked, except when in use (GQ).  They could be flooded from several places outside the magazines, in case of emergency.

 

Loading Ammo--This was an "All Hands" job.  Everyone, not on watch, carried 5" shell and powder cans, 40MM and 20MM cases.  When we came into port (in combat area), we always did 2 things right away-refuel and take on ammo.  Then we were ready for anything.  Before we went into any repair facility in the US, we had to unload all our ammo and when leaving re-load.  Usually the Ammo Depot would bring a YFN (a yard barge, specially fitted to carry ammo) out to our anchorage.  The crew would carry the ammo from the barge to our magazines. 

 

In the forward areas, we'd get ammo from either a merchant ship or a Navy Ammo Ship (AE).  We'd go alongside the ship.  They would fill a large box with ammo and hoist it on our deck.  Our men would take the shells, etc. down to the magazines.  It was a hot dirty job.  Every once in awhile someone would drop a 5'' shell on our deck-"panicsville".  It would be quickly thrown over the side. 

 

Loading machine--All DD's had loading machines so the gun crews could practice. Every morning, weather permitting, each gun crew practiced one hour.  It took a lot of strength, stamina, and coordination between all members of the gun crew to be effective.  They worked up a good appetite for lunch. 

 

Maintenance and Upkeep--The small arms weren't much trouble.  They were cleaned after being fired.  The officers cleaned their own guns.

20MM--after every firing the guns had to be thoroughly cleaned, the barrel springs inspected.  Since there was only 1 electrical circuit, the sight, maintenance was relatively easy.

40MM--It was a more complex gun and needed more work after each firing.  The guns and barrels were cleaned.  All electrical and hydraulic lines, fittings were gone over daily.

5"-38--guns and directors, and entire system.  This system had miles of electrical cables and hydraulic lines.  After every firing, the guns were thoroughly cleaned, including the barrels.  When we were on the ARLEIGH BURKE, in 1993, I noted they had cleaning rods, brushes very similar to what we used 50 years ago. 

 

All lines were inspected daily and after each use..  Because of our fine maintenance schedules, we had very little trouble with our equipment.  The guns had canvas muzzle bags to keep the elements out of the barrels.  There were also canvas protection where the mount and gun joined.  We called them "Bloomers".  Both were usually removed prior to firing, but it an emergency, not necessary.

 

TORPEDO/DEPTH CHARGE GANG

 

We, like most WWII DD's of our class, had 10 torpedo tubes, 5 fish in each mount (quintupled).  Some ships of our type had one or both sets of tubes removed during the war, to lighten topside weight and to add additional 40MM guns, for more AA punch.  We kept our 10 throughout the war.

 

Torpedoes were a holdover (relic) from the by gone days when our ancestor ships (WILKES #1), were torpedo boats.  Originally Destroyers were small ships designed to deliver torpedo attacks against the enemy "ships of the line" (capital ships like battleships and cruisers).  In the evolutionary process by WWI, the cans grew larger and had other functions (i.e. ASW and convoying), as WILKES #2 (DD 67), did.  By the time our ship was designed and built, Navy strategists still thought in terms of BB's and cruisers.  However in practice, during the war, the role of cans evolved into ASW, convoying, gun/shore fire ship, and AA defense of carrier TF, with little chance to use the torpedo. 

 

In the Atlantic there were only 2 major instances, where surface torpedo attacks were/ could be made.  They were the British sinking of the of the BISMARCK-May 23-27, 1941 and our own encounter with the Vichy French cruisers and DD's, off Casablanca.    In the Pacific, the gallant torpedo attacks by our cans and DE's in the Battle of Leyte Gulf on the battle fleet of Admiral Kurita.  After this battle, enemy surface ships were mighty scarce.  However in early battles-Java Sea--Feb27/28, 1942 and in Aug 1942-in the sea battles around Guadalcanal, Savo Island the Japanese "long lance" torpedoes were very effective.

 

Our CO's were always looking for an opportunity to fire our "fish" at a real live enemy (close up and personal).  Captain Mc Lean came close, when we engaged the Vichy ships off Casablanca.  However, discretion won out over valor, and we were covered by our own cruisers.  The "Wolf" was looking forward to getting in close to a Jap Cruiser or DD and firing, but it was not to be.  I'm sure the rest of the crew, especially the torpedo gang were disappointed.  We did fire practice "fish" (see Sea Stories), with mixed results. 

 

Our people put in many hours of hard work to keep the "fish" in top notch condition and ready to fire at a moment's notice, but we never came close to really firing them in anger.  The Torpedo Officer and the watch officers practiced with the director, mounted on the flying bridge, directly over the pilot house.  This director was a rather simple optical affair, nothing complicated-no electronics, or radar. Firing the fish would be directed by CIC, which would solve the "problem" and give the director the proper lead on the target.  The torpedo officer was hooked in with CIC, the bridge, and the torpedo tubes by sound powered phones. The CO made the final decisions. 

 

Our torpedoes were 21 inches in diameter. weighing a 2215 pound and were about 20 feet long.  They had a maximum range of 4500 yards at 46 knots.  To be effective a can had to get close to its target before firing.  They were divided in 5 major sections.  The first-the warhead, which contained 500 pounds of TNT.  Later models had 1,100 pounds of Torpex (a more potent explosive).  Second: the air flask (fuel and water).  Third:  the midship section, which was rather small and contained the combustion flask igniter.  Fourth:  the after body (oil tank, turbine, depth engine, gyro steering engine, immersion mechanism, starting engine, depth index.  Fifth:  the tail, which had the exhaust manifold, 2 sets of props on 1 shaft and 4 tail fins for stability. They could be fired singly, or in any combination or all 12 sequentially.

 

Originally the warhead had a magnetic exploder.  It was supposed to explode either by contact with the target or set off by its magnetic field.  It just didn't work. By July 1943, these exploders were inactivated.  So they went back to the old contact method. 

 

The mounts themselves were on the centerline of the ship and could fire either port or starboard.  They were trained by the mount trainer-matching pointers with the director or manually.  The fish could be fired either from the mounts or from the director.  The trainer wore sound powered phones, which he could use to contact the Director, CIC, Bridge.  The second member of the crew-the gyro setter, put in the gyro setting into the fish.  The mount captain was the man in charge. 

 

The fish were propelled by burning alcohol and oxygen (in flasks) under high pressure.  Thus the term "torpedo juice", for 100% pure alcohol.  They were launched by compressed air, then the fish's engine took over. 

 

Depth charges/"K" guns.  While they were under the supervision of the Gunnery Dept, we always thought of them being associated with the torpedomen.   We had 2 types of depth charges (their nickname--ash cans, as they resembled an ashcan-big, round, heavy and ugly).  The Mark 7 weighed a bit more than 700 pounds and were stowed in 2 roller racks at the very end of the fantail.  The 300 plus pounders were used on the "K" guns, which were on each side of the ship, on the main deck, just aft of Gun #5.  All charges were kept on "safe", until ready to be dropped/fired.  Early in the war several cans suffered heavy casualties, when their charges exploded, when the ships were sunk (the INGRAHAM was such a victim).

 

The Mark 7's were held in the racks by forward and after detents.  They were released by a lever, which disengaged the detents and they just rolled off the racks into the water.  The charges had an exploder and the crew would set it to explode at a predetermined depth.  Shallow was 50 feet, 200+ was deep.  The sonar officer and CO could estimate the sub's depth with our sonar equipment.  Later in the War, the charges were re-shaped--"tear drop, with fins", for a more uniform sink rate.  The older type tended to tumble and the sink rate varied considerably.  When the charges exploded they made a huge hole in the ocean.  A 50 foot geyser of water was thrown into the sky and the whole ship shook, from the shock.  The replacement charges were stowed in a magazine, aft and below decks.  It was quite a chore to get them up on deck and into the racks. 

 

KGuns--had a smaller depth charge weighing a bit more than 300 pounds.  They were secured to the tray by a steel chain, and the tray sat on top of the arbor.  When fired, the arbor, tray and charge would fly about 50-75 yards from the ship.  The guns could be fired locally by a lanyard or electrically from the bridge.  These  charges were also set to explode at a set depth-the same as the larger ones.  By 1943, a "roller-loader" was developed for loading the K guns, which helped the crew reload, by reducing the time and lifting required. 

 

A typical medium depth charge pattern might be 5-6 charges rolled off the stern and 3 from the K guns firing from both sides, for a total of 13/14 charges per run/attack, set to explode at 150 feet.  The explosions, if close enough to a sub, would exert great pressure on the sub's hull (water can't be compressed) and kill it.

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The Torpedo "Gang", usually had 14 men, ranging from Chief to S 1/c.  They were responsible for the operation and maintenance of 8 K-gun depth charge launchers (4 each side aft, near the fantail), 2 stern racks of depth charges and 10 torpedoes and the compressed air launch system. Every day, we had to inspect, repair and maintain our "fish", depth charges, etc..  Our technical training and on the job experience was centered on the handling  volatile, explosive depth charges and "fish", extremely high pressure compressed air tanks, the installation and setting of the activating devices used in the launching of the "fish" and setting the depth charge "depth settings".  Speed and accuracy were MUST's.  We drilled every day and every move was automatic. 

 

The "grunt" jobs, included corrosion control (chip paint), removal and installation of depth charges (very heavy work), the taking the "fish" out of the tubes for servicing. While the components were very heavy, they were also delicate and had to be handled with care and respect. 

 

Another important job:  safe guarding the torpedo stores locker (always kept locked).  It contained our supply of 180 proof grain alcohol, commonly known as "TORPEDO JUICE." 

 

Harold Swanson TM 3/c

 

 

NAVIGATION DEPT

 

This was one of the most important jobs on the WILKES, as on any sea going vessel.  Once the ship left the safe haven of the dock/pier/anchorage, the safety of the ship, its crew and any other ship entrusted to its care, rested on the NAVIGATOR and COMMANDING OFFICER.  The navigator was the CO's right hand man, in advising him of the safe/proper course and speed to get to our destination.

 

His job was to know where the ship is, where it is going, and how to get there safely.  There are 2 major sub-divisions in navigation--piloting and celestial navigation.   LORAN (long range navigation)-using radio signals, came towards the end of the war and did us no good in the far Pacific.  Navigation is an art, rather than a science, and good seamanship, judgment, played an important role. 

 

Piloting is the navigation of the ship, within sight of land, using ranges and bearings on familiar (charted) terrestrial objects, such as light houses, marker buoys, buildings, etc.  Celestial navigation is the art of navigating the ship on the open sea, far from land.  This is done by taking "sights" on the sun, moon, stars and planets.   

 

On the WILKES the principle navigational instrument for piloting was the gyro compass and the gyro-repeaters located on both wings of the bridge.  Before the ship got underway, to go to sea, the navigator would study the chart which showed the ship's berth/ anchorage and the channel to be used in leaving port.  He would carefully note the position of buoys and other markings that defined the channel.  The quartermasters would take bearings on the channel markers, etc. and give them to the navigator, who would plot the ship's position and course on the chart.  If the channel was well marked, piloting was a relatively easy task. The Captain would need little help from the navigator, as to the proper courses to steer.  However in the forward areas, we didn't have the luxury of such well marked channels and piloting was much more difficult.  Many places, we were one of the first ships in the area, and our charts were sketch, at the best.  We made excellent use of the SG (surface search) radar-both in daylight and at night or in periods of low visibility.  Our radar operators could give accurate ranges (distance) and bearings on prominent geographic features, such as capes, harbor entrances, islands, etc. 

 

Once outside of a well defined channel but still within sight of land, the navigator had to be prepared to give the CO, courses, distances and estimated time of arrival (ETA).  Also he had to advise the CO, of any shoal areas, hazards to navigation, etc.in the area.  The ship's location was determined on a chart, by taking bearings with the gyro compass repeater on objects marked on the chart.  He kept a continuous plot of our course on his chart.  Also CIC had a DRT and they, if requested, would back up the navigator.  Normally this was routine for CIC.

 

The precise position of the ship, was absolutely essential for shore bombardment.  The navigator had to plot our position, so the guns could be fired at the right object/position/place.  Since we did this very often, it was a fairly routine for him.  He was the man, who "coached" the CO into the proper firing position.

 

When we were on the open sea, outside the sight of land, navigation on the WILKES was done almost entirely by celestial means. It was essential to identify prominent stars.  Chief Quartermaster Dan Weisbrod kept a set of pages from an old National Geographic  that showed many of the constellations.   A sextant was used to measure (in degrees) the elevation (altitude) of a star, planet, sun or moon, above the visible horizon.  Taking sextant observations on several known heavenly bodies was done in the morning about 30 minutes prior sunrise and in the evening between 15 and 30 minutes after sunset, assuming acceptable visibility. Using the sextant measurements, knowing the PRECISE times the measurements were made (using  watches carefully calibrated against the ship's chronometer).  He would take his sight  and say "MARK" and the watches held by the Chief Quartermaster and QM l/c would be stopped, compared and the readings recorded.   Then, using certain Hydrographic Office pubs, (HO 214, 249 and the Nautical Almanac), the navigator could calculated the ship's position with precision. The HO 214 was used to compute the altitude of a heavenly body and 249, which had the actual declination of certain (commonly used) stars. 

 

 Between the fixes, the ship's position was estimated by a technique called dead reckoning, which made use of the courses steered, the ship's speed, elapsed time, wind and currents, if any.  This is where the "art" part came in.  The DRT (dead reckoning tracer), traced the ship's course and speed.  The "bug" followed the ship's dead reckoning track. It was mounted on an arm whose movement was controlled by the ship's gyro compass (ship's course) and by the pitometer (pit) log (ship's speed). The bug could be adjusted to move at various scales -200 yards per inch to 16 miles to an inch (usual scale 1,000/2,000 yards).  By using the DRT and other factors, the navigator could/would estimate our position.  This was necessary in time of poor visibility (no star/sun sights possible).

 

On the WILKES, the navigator's work station was  the chart house, located behind the pilot house.  A workman is known by the tools of his trade.  All his "tools" were stored there: sextants, charts, publications, chronometer, stop watches, universal drafting arm, dividers, parallel rulers, etc.  Charts in use were spread out on a large chart table, for use by the navigator, CO, XO, OOD. The chronometers were kept in a chest.   They had to be wound daily, at the same time, and a record was kept of any chronometer errors relative to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).  Charts not in use, were placed flat in drawers under the chart table-all plainly marked.

 

Since our Commodore often lead other ships, it was most important that our navigation be correct.  Lots of ships depended on us being right, even though each ship's navigator had the duty to do his own navigation. 

 

Wally Magee--Navigator

 

MEDICAL DEPT

 

While our medical depart was rather small, it was very important, when a crew member got sick or hurt.  We were most fortunate that none of our people got wounded, but on several occasions, our Medical Officer (doctor) took care of other wounded men.  When  downed air crews were picked up, he always checked them over and gave what ever medical attention needed.  In the Admiralties and later on in Western New Guinea, we took on Army wounded, and our doctor  operated on the severely wounded, ably assisted  by his staff and officer volunteers.  All but 2 recovered.  On a couple of occasions, our doctor had to go to other ships to assist their MD in surgery.  Once in the North Atlantic, we transferred Dr. Stollman, via hi-line to another can in the convoy, to assist their MD..  Also in the Pacific, Dr Wyatt was hi-lined to a ship to exam a sick man. Once hi-lined over to another ship, he had to be hi-lined back.

 

Emergency first aid equipment was placed through out the ship.  Aluminum stretchers were placed in all compartments, and on the passage ways, and on the exposed decks. 

 

Whenever there was a serious illness/accident, we were not equipped to handle it, except as an emergency.  We tried to get the ill/injured man to either the tender, hospital ship, shore hospital, or larger ship (i.e. carrier), where they had more and  better equipment.  As mentioned previously, our operating room was the wardroom table--not exactly hi-tech. However we had a complete set of surgical instruments, an autoclave to sterilize medical material/instruments  and everything else needed to give the crew adequate medical attention.  There were about 3 "beds" for anyone seriously injured/ill. 

 

There were 3  medical doctors during the ship's life-  Dr. Alessandro Trombetta, Dr. Bernard Stollman, Dr. Robert Wyatt--all top notch.  We also had 3-4 rated pharmacist mates and a couple of "strikers" to assist the doctors and to do the routine shots, keep the medical records, etc.

 

REFUELING/ REPLENISHMENT

 

Our fuel capacity was fairly limited.  We could hold slightly more than 100,000 gals of NSFO (Naval Special Fuel Oil). Normally the first thing we did, when we entered a harbor, was to refuel from either a tanker or from a dock, if in the US.  Most Navy Operating Bases (NOB)  had either a fuel depot or yard craft (YO), to refuel us.  If we used an appreciable amount while in port, we'd refuel again before we left.  Forward areas always had a tanker, usually a Fleet Tanker (AO) or a merchant ship converted into a tanker (IX).  The CO had to out the ship alongside the anchored tanker, which was usually no problem.  The same applied to replenishment (i. e.-taking on stores and supplies, ammo).  In all major ports there were usually a Naval Supply Depot (NSD).  We'd get supplies by truck, if at a pier.  If at anchor, we either got a YC (yard craft) or an LCM alongside and all hands turned to, to bring the material on board. 

 

AT SEA:  Refueling at sea was a dangerous operation.  During our career, we refueled at sea, frequently, from a variety of ships (AO, BB, CA, CL, CV, CVE, merchant ship).  During our convoy duty in the Atlantic, there was always a tanker along to refuel the escorts. We refueled 2-3 times each crossing.  In the Pacific, when we operated with TF 38/58, we refueled from the carriers, almost every day-2 days-max.  Running at 30+ kts we burned a lot of fuel.

 

It required great skill and courage by the CO, plus a very good helmsman, to go within 50-100 feet of another ship at 10-15 kts.   Reasonably good weather was a primary requirement.  If the seas were too rough, it was not possible to refuel-too dangerous, both to the ships and to the people doing the refueling.  Our people would get plenty wet, even in moderate seas.  Later in the war, some fleet tankers were equipped  and trained to refuel -astern, to enable refueling in rather rough weather. 

 

Steps:  The OTC decided when the escorts refueled.  Every day, each ship sent him a noon report, telling him the amount of fuel on board.   It was important to have a considerable margin of safety, so fueling was done at about 50% capacity.  The cans lost in the Typhoon, late in the War, got caught in severe weather with less than 20% fuel.  Some didn't properly ballast  (with sea water) and capsized.  Fuel was a high priority concern of the Skipper. 

 

Tankers and CV's could refuel an escort on either side, as they had proper hose, booms, pumps, etc.  In the Atlantic convoys, the tankers were the last ship, usually in the center column.  The escorts, senior first, would leave their screen position, proceed to the tanker and approach her from the rear.  Our speed, as we got close, was usually 2-3 kts faster than the tanker.  As we got on station, the CO had to adjust our course and speed to conform with the tanker and stay  about 50-75 feet away.  We had 3 fueling stations (both port and starboard): on the foc'sl, midships-just  aft the break in the deck, and aft.  There were trunks leading to the fuel tanks.  The whole operation was a team effort: CO, XO, Deck and Eng Div.  The Oil King was a key man for the engineers.  He took the soundings of the tanks, pumped fuel between tanks, and made sure no oil spilled.  The Deck Div handled the lines and hoses,  As we came abreast of the tanker, our people would throw a heaving line, with a "monkey fist" on the receiving end.  The mooring lines were passed and secured, then the tanker, would pay out the hose with its hose booms.  We'd  secure the hoses to the trunks.  We'd signal the tanker to start pumping.  When the Oil King said our tanks were full, we'd tell the tanker to stop pumping.  Then the process would be reversed.  The hoses and lines were cast off and the tanker would hoist them back. Then,  we'd be on our way back to our screen station.  Another escort would have been right behind us, and approaching to take our spot.  This would continue until all were refueled.  On the ship, the quick and proper handling of lines, fuel hoses, by the deck people, was almost like a ballet.  Everyone knew their role, all did it, almost instinctively.

 

Refueling from carriers was much more difficult.  The process was the same, but the carrier's bulk, overhanging flight deck and protruding gun sponsons, made it, a very intimidating presence.  Precision station keeping was a MUST.  More than one can had gotten caught under the overhang, with the can coming out a bad second best. 

 

It was a thrill to be so close to a large tanker, carrier, BB, etc..  You could almost reach out and touch them.  It made you happy to be on a "can". 

 

 

 

REPLENISHMENT/PASSING MAIL/HI-LINING PEOPLE--UNDERWAY

 

The technique was the same as for refueling, with some minor differences.  We'd go alongside the AK/AKA the exact same way as refueling.  Receiving stores via hi-line was a long laborious job and not done unless we were very low on food.  Only 2 or 3 slings of stores could be transferred on each "trip".  After we took the boxes/pallets out of the slings, we'd have to send the slings back for another load.  This was repeated until we got our quota. 

 

Passing mail between ships was routine.  We'd pass official and US mail-incoming-outgoing.  While there were some close calls, there was only one occasion, we had trouble (See Sea Stories). 

 

People-There again the same technique of going alongside another ship. On several occasions we hi-lined the Commodore to one of the other ships in our Division.  Our MD's were sent to other ships to help/treat sick men.  We rescued many downed air crews and then hi-lined back to their carriers.   

 

MAKING SMOKE

 

All DD's had the capabilty to make SMOKE.  Originally the equipment was designed to shield the Capital ships from attack or to screen DD's while making torpedo attacks on the enemy Capital ships.  We had 6 smoke generators (3 on top of each other) on the stern, in between the depth charge racks.  We could also make smoke from the firerooms, up through the funnels (stacks).  Our smoke generators never did work very well, however we could make a very effective screen from the stacks.  We used to practice doing it.  In combat we only used it twice-once in Sicily and much later, around Okinawa (Kerama Retto), to shield the ships from enemy planes (kamikaze attacks).  When we made smoke, we'd be going 25 kts or so.

 

 

FIRST LIEUTENANT--DECK DIVISIONS

 

The deck and engineering departments were the 2 largest depts on the ship.  The head of the Deck Divisions was called the First Lieutenant/Damage Control Officer.  He usually had 2 assistants to help him and to learn the job.

 

His domain was all you would see, as you crossed the quarter deck, plus all the compartments below deck, not part of the engineering dept.  He had 2 main jobs that complimented each other.  The first and a continuing job was the maintenance and upkeep of the ship (outside of the engineering spaces).  The second and equally important was Damage Control, Fire Fighting, and the water tight integrity of the ship. 

 

When recent graduates from boot camp came on board, they either started in the Engineering or Deck Divisions.  They learned their "trade" from the ground up.

 

UPKEEP AND MAINTENANCE

 

There is an old saying "Cleanness is next to Godliness."  If true, the "W" and her crew were right up there in heaven.  Perhaps that is why our "Lucky Name?"  All hands took pride in "OUR" ship.  It was our home and a reflection of all hands--from the CO to the newest S 2/c. Every day, weather and battle conditions permitting, the deck people had to work on the ship-chipping, scrapping, grinding and painting, the hull and superstructure.  We always operated in a very abrasive environment.  The storms of the North Atlantic and the heat, sun and humidity of the tropics took its toll on the ship.  To keep the ship looking like "a taut ship", was a never ending job.  Due to combat restrictions, we couldn't carry much paint (it burns), routine work had to be postponed until we hit port.  Then the whole dept. "turned to", to repair, paint and renew.  Keeping the ship looking good, meant a constant battle against rust.  The only effective protection-was PAINT.  In our day, there weren't any paint rollers, so it had to be brushed on.  The larger ships, and of course the ship yards had spray guns, but we didn't rate them. Painting in compartments and confined spaces, care had to be given to proper ventilation.  The paint we used had a lead base and heavy with toxic solvent vapors.  At that time little as known about toxic fumes, etc., but the Navy, from long experience, required the use of a filter type respirator, and venting of confined areas. 

 

The engineers took care of their spaces.  The bridge gang kept their area painted.  It wasn't widely known, but most of our superstructure was aluminum, so it didn't need chipping,etc, just painting.  This was due to our design (top-heavy) and need to lessen top-side weight. 

 

When in dry-dock, all hands helped the yard/tender people to scrap, and paint the hull.  That was a terrible dirty, hard and disagreeable job, but one that had to be done.  A special anti-fouling paint was used, to retard and discourage marine growth.

 

They maintained the life rafts, life rings, lines,etc.  In an emergency, these had to work or our fellow crew members could lose their lives.  Fortunately we never had such an experience, although they were used to rescue downed pilots. 

 

PERSONNEL

 

Some of the specialties of the dept. were:  carpenter, sail maker (did canvas work), ship fitter, boatswains mate.  The carpenter was a key man in our damage control parties.  He did the shoring, make temporary bulkheads, etc. and in our 2 major accidents, the prompt and fine work of the damage control parties, contributed to saving the ship.    The ship fitter was another key player.  He did the welding and cutting.  In our 2 major accidents, he and his people played a key role.  The boatswains mates, and their crews, were the men, who did the rest.  They anchored, moored, chipped, painted, worked the damage control parties, maintained and operated the various pieces of emergency equipment i.e.-fire extinguishers fire hoses, nozzles, mains, the RBA's(rescue breathing apparatus), handy billies, manned the ship's boat, furnished about 40% of the mess cooks, master's at arms, furnished most of the men for the magazines, handling rooms, and manned the various guns.  And last but not least, gave the men for lookouts, on the bridge. 

 

Ship board fire is the destroyer man's worst nightmare.  Here again we were very fortunate.   Except for an occasional small and easily controlled  fire, usually electrical, we escaped unharmed.  Many of our fellow "cans" suffered severe damage/loss and casualties due to enemy action i.e. shell fire, torpedo hits, bomb and later in the war-suicide plane attacks.  We drilled and drilled again our damage control parties in fire fighting.  Each member could do his job instinctively.  Every major US Navy base, i.e.. Boston, NY, Casco Bay, Norfolk had fire fighting schools. At every opportunity, we sent our people to get the "latest word" and to practice.  Most officers and crew members went to at least one such training course. 

 

One of the primary requirements was an intimate and thorough knowledge of the ship.  When the ship was built, steel framing members were used to built the hull.  Each frame was number-forward/aft.  Every passageway, deck, compartment had brass frame numbers on the bulkhead.  These frame numbers were the basic reference points on the ship.  Each compartment was numbered-fore-aft.  Every water tight hatch had a code number i.e.. "X" "Y".   The First Lt. had a complete, up to date diagrams of the whole ship.  It showed among other things: each frame, compartment number, location of fresh/salt water mains, fuel tanks/lines, all valves, the placement of all fire fighting equipment, water tight hatches, electrical lines, etc.  He worked closely with the engineering officer and his people in fire fighting and damage control. 

 

WATER-TIGHT INTERGITY/DAMAGE CONTROL

 

This is also a joint effort with the engineering dept.  This was a life/death problem.  When we suffered the grounding and collision in 1942, the fate of the ship and its crew hung in the balance.  There was serious doubt the WILKES would survive.  But survive we did, due in large part to the prompt, automatic and correct response by all hands.  The shoring of the bulkheads, after both the grounding and collision, the securing of the high pressure steam lines by the people in #1 fireroom, after the collision.  If they failed in their duty, the ship may not have survived.  THEY DID AND WE DID!!  The key was training, more training plus dedication to duty/ship/ shipmates.  There is an old saying: "You make your own luck."

 

We drilled our Damage Control Parties almost every day, either at GQ or as a "surprise drill".  The CO or OOD would announce over the 1MC-"This is a drill--Fire in the paint locker."  Our parties were ready to go at a moments notice.  We had fire hoses, nozzles, extinguishers. buckets of sand, emergency lighting, battery powered lanterns, along with axes, crowbars, along the passageways, and in compartments. 

 

They had handy billies, which were gas powered pumps to be used in the event the ship's electrical system was disabled. These pumps could be used for fire fighting or pumping out flooded compartments.  In conjunction with the engineering dept., they drilled putting pumps into flooded compartments.  Ammo handling rooms/magazines could be flooded in an emergency.  All D/C parties had rescue breathing apparatus (RBA's).  In  conjunction with the engineering dept., they drilled putting pumps into flooded compartments.  Nothing was overlooked or left to chance. 

 

MOORING/ANCHORING 

 

When we came into port, we either anchored out, or moored to a dock, alongside another ship, or to a buoy.  Anchoring was probably the easiest.  The navigator guided the CO to the assigned anchorage.  At the proper time (when the bow was in the center of the anchorage), the CO ordered "Drop Anchor".  In forward area, we just dropped the anchor in what we (the CO) thought was a suitable place.  The First Lt. would direct his men to release the anchor and chain, and pay out the length of chain (scope) ordered by the CO. We had 2 anchors, stowed in hawse pipes on either side of the bow. One was usually sufficient. The anchor windlass was used to control the rate the chain was paid out.  The "shots" of chain were marked so the forecastle gang would know how much chain was used. At 20 fathoms (120 feet)-(5 fathom bending shot plus the first 15 fathoms), the links on each side of the shackle was marked by a turn of wire and painted white. At the 35 fathom mark, 2 turns of wire and 2 links on either side of the shackle were painted white.  At 50 fathoms -the third link on each side of the shackle was painted white with 3 turns of wire. When that was done, they would secure the chain and secure the forecastle. On leaving the anchorage, the anchor windlass was used to hoist the chain and anchor.  The men would use high pressure salt water on the chain to clean it, when it was coming through the hawse pipe. If this wasn't done, there would be a muddy mess in the chain locker.  There are many details omitted, but we tried to hit the important points.

 

Mooring to a buoy-usually by the bow alone, but occasionally by both bow and stern..  The later was a bit  harder.  The ship's boat had to be used to carry the mooring lines/cable to the buoy, through the bull nose in the bow.  The man on the buoy put the lines/cables through the   swivel on the top of the buoy and back to the ship. The bow of the ship had to be next to the buoy and held there.  It was a tricky maneuver requiring guts and skill on the part of the boat crew and the man on the buoy. The lines were always doubled up-sometimes triple.  Then they were secured .  The windlass was used to help handle the lines/cable-draw them taut.  On leaving, the reverse procedure was done. 

 

Mooring alongside a pier or to another ship required great skill by the CO and deck division people.  This was specially true, when there was a tide, current present or wind blowing-sometimes all 3.  If we were going into a Navy Shipyard or Base, we sometimes got a tug to assist us, but most of the time, we were on our own.  The First Lt. and one of his assistants was always on the forecastle, as the prompt securing the bowline was essential and most important.   A boatswains mate would have a light heaving line, with a "monkey fist" on the end.  He'd throw the monkey fist to the men on the dock/pier/ ship.  It took a strong man to get it over-he could make the Yankees as an outfielder.  We had a line throwing gun, but it rarely used it. -it was dangerous to the men on the receiving end.  Even with a monkey fist, the receiving people had to "look alive" and not get hit-it hurt!  The regular mooring line was then attached to the heaving line and receiving men would heave it in.  Care was used not to dip the mooring lines in the water.  Wet lines are extra heavy, and if the water was polluted with oil-a big mess.  Once the bow line was secured, the CO had to backdown on the opposite (out board) screw to kick the stern into the pier/ship.  We usually had 3 sets of lines secured from the forecastle, 2 midships, and 3 from the stern-8 lines and all doubled up.  Since we usually were the inboard ship at a pier, we had to put rat guards on all our lines. 

 

In getting underway, just about the reverse was done.  All lines were singled up, the last line to be cast off, was the bow line.  The CO had to kick the stern away from the dock or ship, using the screws, and back clear.  Once that was done, we were on our way.  Fenders were brought in and secured.  The mooring lines were secured and the ship was ready for sea. 

 

Fenders-  They were the "savior" of poor ship handlers.  They kept ships from banging into other ships/pier/ docks, when mooring alongside.  We had lots of fenders-as did all ships.  They were made out of cane, or rope.  The deck division men had the job  putting fenders over the side to cushion the "blows".  After placing them a few times, you got to know-what-where and when to use them. 

 

In Boots, all hands got some training in Marlinespike Seamanship.  On board ship, those in the deck gang got to practice what they had learned, tying knots, handling line, which were part of their daily routine.  They learned to repair canvas, tarps, make bags.  Some developed a real talent and were able to make very fine things.   

 

Unless we were coming into the Brooklyn Shipyard, we would put the ship's boat in the water.  That was the job of the midship's section of the Special Sea Detail.  Some skill was needed to put the boat in safely and to pick it up when leaving port.  Great skill, both by the boat crew and ship's people, when the boat was launched and picked up while at sea, especially if there was a sea running. When we picked up the boat, we always picked up the bow first and when launching, just the opposite- the stern was put in the water first. The boat coxswain (Fullerton and Paul Craig), bow hook of  the boat were always from the deck division.  The engineer was from the engineering divisions.  Both John Mercer and Louis  Schwartz were excellent engineers. When not in use, the boat was tied up (the proper term is "making the boat fast") to the stern of the ship, by the sea painter.  This was also used to secure the boat to the ship, when putting the boat in the water and picking it up.   

 

Since we only had one boat, it was a very precious and scarce commodity.  It had to be kept in first class working order.  The engineers did the work on the motor and the deck gang, the rest.  Since the boat's appearance was one of the hall marks of  the ship, the CO was concerned that it was 100%. Originally, we had another boat, but we were quite top-heavy, so the 2nd boat was deleted after the grounding in Newfoundland.  With the Commodore on board most of the time, plus we carried other high ranking officers, the boat and its crew had a heavy schedule, while we were in port.  In rescuing downed pilots, the crews did a fine job.     

 

Gas Cylinders--We had several types of gas cylinders ( such as acetylene, oxygen, compressed air) on board.  They were used both by the deck gang and the engineers. They all had distinctive color markings.  For example: the oxygen was marked with a light green stripe and a black body.  Great care had to be take with the storage and care of these cylinders. 

 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER (XO)

 

The XO was second in command on the ship.  When the CO was on leave, liberty or off the ship, he was the boss.  In most cases he was understudying for a command of his own.  Several of our XO got their own ships, including Captain Wolsieffer, who was XO prior to becoming our CO.  Being XO was a rather thankless job.  He was the man between the CO and the rest of  the crew.  He ran the administrative part of the ship.  He oversaw the ship's office, which did

all the correspondence with higher commands and other ships and stations.  Even with a war on, the paper work never stopped, it just increased.  He also oversaw the operation of all depts. Unless there was a problem, the dept. heads usually ran their areas, without much supervision. 

 

He did inspections of the ship, living compartments, mess hall, galley.  Cleanness and tidiness were the "watch words."  Most of his work was done in a low key fashion.  Results and substance rather than show were their aim. 

 

He was the CO's right hand man, assisting him in any way he could.  Dick Weiss did double duty as navigator, ably assisted by CQM "Muddy" Waters and his QM's.  At GQ he was where he could be most valuable/useful-usually on the bridge, but sometimes in CIC (especially at night) and secondary Conn (aft). Whenever we entered or left port, the XO would do the piloting, given the CO new courses to steer and suggested speeds.  When we fired shore bombardment, he plotted our position and got us to the correct spot to be most effective.

 

 He supervised the work of the Masters-at-Arms.  The M/A were the "policemen".  They were all very responsible Petty Officers, who could be trusted to make the right decisions as to the conduct of the enlisted men.  With a few rare exceptions, we didn't have many problems.  Most times, it involved coming back from liberty, and being more or less "under the weather."

 

LUCKY BAG-- Navy Regs required all clothing be marked with the owner's name.  At the beginning of Boot Camp, the Navy furnished, without cost, a complete outfit of clothing to each recruit.  On the ship, the M/A policed all living spaces (compartments).  Any clothing and other gear adrift would be picked up by the M/A and put in the Lucky Bag.  At intervals, the clothing would be returned to the owners.  Also each Division M/A would periodically inspect crew member's sea bags, lockers.  Woe to anyone with clothing or gear that didn't belong to him. 

 

AIRING BEDDING

 

This was part of the administrative organization.  If weather conditions permitted, each Division  rotated airing bedding.  The mattresses and their covers were taken outside on deck and draped over the life lines, or other convenient places.  All hands had a green fire proof covering for their mattresses.  When we were at GQ for extended periods or in heavy weather (in the North Atlantic) bedding didn't get aired and you could smell it in the compartments. 

 

SMOKING

 

It was called the "smoking lamp", a phrase going back to the days of sailing ships.  On the "W" almost everyone smoked.  Cigarettes were readily available and cheap at the ship's store.  During the War, there was no smoking allowed on exposed decks after dusk.  The ship was blacked out--There were NO exceptions.  Smoking was absolutely forbidden during refueling and handling ammo.   Any time no smoking was going into effect, the watch would pass the word over the 1MC "The smoking lamp is out."  When it was OK to resume smoking the word was passed: "The smoking lamp is now lit."  No one going into magazines, or ammo handling rooms could have matches/lighters with them.  There  was no smoking allowed at Quarters or in the ship's boat.    

 

MASTER AT ARMS

 

This job was another one that was as old as the Navy.  He was a petty officer in charge of a certain area of the ship.  Each compartment had a MAA. He kept order, made sure everyone's bunk was properly made up, the fire proof mattress cover in place, all hands aired bedding when required, everyone got up at reveille, the compartment was clean and painted.  He was the cop on the beat.  He worked under the direction of the Division Officer and XO. 

 

 

 

COMMANDING OFFICER (CO)

 

The Commanding Officer was variously called the CO/ Captain/ Skipper/ The Old Man/ and various other unprintable and less polite names. 

 

The Captain of a US Navy ship without regard to his rank, or size of the ship, was  and still is the person totally responsible for the safety and running of HIS ship, as well as the welfare, well being and safety of its crew, both officer and enlisted.  It was a very heavy responsibility and one that could never be delegated to anyone else.  He was fully accountable for the performance of his ship.  If it did well, he got the credit.  If it did poorly, he was blamed.  His primary responsibility was the safety of  the ship and its crew.  However, in combat, the CO of a "can" was expected to sail in "harms way", to engage the enemy, and to protect the ships entrusted to his care.  This dual responsibility, safety of his ship and safety of ships he was escorting was, not compatible.  His duty to his other responsibility always seemed primary.  The "W" had 4 major responsibilities--1.  In the North Atlantic , Med and Pacific, ASW, AA protection of merchant ships and  large combat ships (CV, BB, CL), we escorted.  2.  Shore bombardment in the 3 theaters-destruction of enemy troops, defenses, equipment, and protection of our soldiers.  3.  AA and ASW defense of our fast carrier TG and TF.  We put ourselves repeatedly between the ships we were protecting and the enemy.   4.  Picket-radar-radio link (i.e. Hollandia, Okinawa, fast carrier TG's).

 

During our life, the "W" was involved in one major and one minor grounding, one major and one minor collision.  In the major accidents, the Captain was held responsible for them, even though there were many factors, outside of his control, which played major roles.  The minor ones, which did not result in any serious damage or injuries, were passed off as part of wartime ops. 

 

Our Skippers came from 4 major depts-engineering, deck(lst Lt), gunnery, navigator.  All served as XO's on cans prior to becoming CO.  All were grads of the USNA, except Captain Herb Rommel.  Towards the end of the War, Reserve Officers were beginning to become CO's of Cans and DE's.  Most held reserve commissions before the war or were very early graduates of the V-7 program. 

 

CO's had to provide a balance between leadership and management.  Of the two responsibilities, leadership was the most important.  Skippers usually left detailed management to the XO and dept heads.  He only became involved, when something untoward happened and his oversight/insight was needed.  He moved between his roles-leader and manager, as the situation required.  One of his jobs was to give all hands a sense of trust, integrity, justice, and safety.  He had to act clearly, confidentially, correctly, and forcefully.  He had to exercise control (leadership) and control (management), many times doing both at the same time.   It was important, the management part didn't over shadow or blur the leadership role.  It was no job for the faint hearted or indecisive.  Decisions, both big and small, had to be made on the spot, almost instinctively.  Decisions had to be the right ones.  Bad ones, ended up in trouble. 

 

As a Skipper, there were very few "typical" days. Each day brought with it new problems and challenges, that had to be faced and resolved.  However there was much routine, that provided the glue which held the crew together.  In the wardroom, the CO was President of the Officer's Mess.  Except for breakfast, no one sat at the table, until the CO was seated at the head.  If he came into the wardroom, all stood.  Unless you had the watch, you didn't leave the table until the CO stood up.  If you had to leave, you would say "Captain, may I be excused?   I have the watch."  In port, 0800, Quarters--All Divisions would muster their people, except for those on watch or excused.  Roll would be taken and the leading PO would report to the Division Officer "All present or accounted for", or All present except ----"  The Division officers and other officers, would muster on the main deck just aft the mast and report to the XO and CO:  "C Division all present and accounted for."  The XO or CO would then make any announcements, etc. for the coming day.  Then the CO would dismiss the officers and they would go about their regular job.

 

Whether in port or at sea, the CO had a myriad of paper work to do.  He had to write out the ship's action reports, officer's fitness reports, make various official reports to higher commands. He had to read all incoming official mail and make decisions on what action, if any, was required.  The ship's senior yeoman, usually prepared the CO's paper work, routed all correspondence, etc.  He read and initialed all incoming radio and visual messages.  He wanted to keep up to date of all operations in our theater.  When we hit port, we got a lot of official mail, even at sea, official mail was hi-lined to us.  There was no escape from the paper work, it never stopped coming. 

 

In port, the CO slept and worked in his cabin, which was just forward of the radio shack-starboard side.  When at sea, he worked in his cabin, when not on the bridge, and slept fully clothed in his sea cabin, which was just aft of the bridge, starboard side.    At night he was easily accessible to the bridge and OOD.  Every night, before he retired, he would write any night orders in the Night Order Book.  Oncoming OOD/JOOD had to read and understand these orders. Some were routine standing orders, some were for that night. If during the night, the OOD had an unusual situation come up, he'd call the CO on the voice tube to the sea cabin and tell him what was going on.  If the CO thought it necessary he'd come on to the bridge and assess the situation.  Most times, the CO would ask a few questions and then tell the OOD what to do, or tell him OK.  It all depended on the situation. 

 

The following are a few examples of the decisions the CO had to make and the skill he had to use. A good decision success, a big one- disaster. Due to our "shortlegs" we had to refuel often.  We refueled from tankers, merchant ships, cruisers, BB's CV's, often in bad weather, with heavy seas.  Each type ship require a different technique.   It is rather intimidating to be within 50-100 feet of a huge carrier and taking on fuel. A mistake in the approach or while alongside, could result in big trouble and could even foul up the refueling schedule for the whole TF/TG and   in a missed opportunity to make a vital air strike against  the enemy. 

 

When preparing for shore bombardment, he had to position the"W" in the right time and place. Failure to get it right, could result in hitting our own troops, or ineffective shore fire. 

 

When we picked up downed pilots, the skipper had to be decisive.  He had to put the "W" in a position to pick up the men in the shortest time and get them safely on board.  When in a carrier formation, or in open sea, getting the men was the first priority but speed was essential.  He had to use great skill.  No place for the faint hearted. 

 

Discipline:  "Good Order and Discipline" was necessary on all Navy ships.  Rules and regulations date back to sailing ships, but the basics still applied. Without it, the ship and its crew would not be effective for very long. In addition, the CO set the "rules", he wanted all hands to observe.  He used various methods (l) meeting with the ship's officers, they in turn would relay the "word" at quarters. (2) memo (3) dope in the Wilkesonian. 

 

Captain's Mast--Transgressors were "put on report" and brought before the CO for a hearing.  The complaint, usually the Div officer, OOD, or M/A would tell the CO "what's the beef".  The man would have an opportunity to explain his actions.  If the CO decided the offender was guilty, he would the give out the punishment (i.e.-losing 4 liberties), or if the offense was more serious -sent to a Deck Court Martial or Summary Courts Martial.  In the Summary Court, there would be a formal hearing before 3 officers and a formal sentence would be adjudged and the paper work was then sent to the CO for approval, modification, or disapproval.  Since most problems were minor, the Mast was the usual proceedings. 

 

COMMAND,  it is the greatest job in the NAVY, and perhaps the greatest and best job in the world.  I was most fortunate to have my command of the WILKES at an early age.

 

How did I get such a wonderful job?  I enlisted in the Naval Reserve in 1934, hoping to get an appointment to the Naval Academy. I took correspondence courses.  I could do a day's work in navigation, without ever having had a sextant in my hand.  In 1938, I re-enlisted.  By this time I had advanced from Apprentice Seaman to Seaman First Class and had 4 years of weekly drills and 3 two week cruises on four stack DD's and one on a battleship.  Then I got my commission as Ensign.  As the US started to re-arm, I was called to active duty, and in 1940 I reported to the USS OKLAHOMA (BB 37).  On her, I became qualified as OOD underway and the turret officer in Turret #4.  When she was sunk at Pearl Harbor, I was then assigned to the USS GRIDLEY (DD 380).  She was the first ship in the CRAVEN Class, commissioned in 1937.  I served on her for three years, under six different skippers.  Before I came to the WILKES,  I was her XO. 

 

When I came to the WILKES, I was only semi-qualified for command (this is in retrospect).  In fact, my first assignment after the WILKES  was de-commissioned, was to the General Line School to learn the things I should have known.

 

Command is a personal thing, each Commanding Officer is different, bringing to his Command a distinctive background, based on his Navy experiences.  In my case, I had ample opportunity to observe what I liked in my superior officers and what, I didn't like.   I tried to take what I considered the best traits and use them.  I had served as an enlisted man.  Three years of wartime experience in watch standing had made me familiar and confident, (perhaps a bit over confident?), with operations of a can. 

 

I wish I had retained notes and items, from the War years, but we were not supposed to keep them.  Almost everything was classified Secret or Confidential.  For example, the Captain's Night Order Book, which contained general instructions plus specific orders for the night.  It contained some of some philosophy of command.  Some CO's spend all their time on the bridge.  I did not.  I usually had meals in the Wardroom, with the other officers.  The OOD was instructed to pass the word, if he needed me ("the Captain is wanted on the bridge").  needless to say, the few times it happened, I really double timed it to the bridge.  The OOD's were reluctant to call the Captain at night.  He slept in his sea cabin, just aft of the bridge.  They didn't want to disturb his sleep.  I was blessed with the ability to get up quickly, solve the problem and then get back to sleep right away.  So I wanted to be called, if it was necessary.  I recall a few times I wished I had been called sooner. 

 

Messages -radio-visual- All messages originating from the ship are considered to be from the Captain.  The Comm Officer would prepare a message for my approval and release. 
Frequently I would change it and change it  and finally change it back to the was it was originally written. 

 

Discipline--A Commanding Officer at sea, has great power.  This dates from time immemorial.  Three days bread and water was probably the worst punishment, along with losing part of his pay for a month.  Also, the CO could reduce a rate, if it had been attained on his ship.  If the rate had been earned on another ship, it would require a courts-martial to reduce the rate.  As I remember, the WILKES was remarkably free from discipline problems.  Discipline was an "all hands evolution", everyone was involved.  We had Liberty Cards and they were controlled by the Division Officer and sometimes by the senior Chief in the Division.  There were informal punishments of  restriction of Liberty, that the CO never knew about.  Of course the WILKES was usually at sea or in advance bases, while I was Captain.  So the opportunity for this type of discipline was not frequent. 

 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER--As mentioned previously, much of the routine and administration of the ship was handled by the XO.  I was blessed with 2 very good ones, while I was on board-Malcolm Raworth and Walt Dixon, who handled their jobs very well. 

 

MEMORIES:  One vivid memory, is sitting on top of the fire control director, one pleasant South Pacific night and watching the fluorescent waves and the flying fish.  With her rounded forecastle, the WILKES  was a beautiful ship.  I TRUSTED HER AND I TRUSTED THE CREW!!!

 

Captain Herbert Rommel, USN Ret